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1. INTRODUCTION                                     
Economic deregulation of the Australian domestic aviation market came into force on 1
November 1990. After a history of regulated duopoly of air services on the national trunk
routes the winds of economic change had finally arrived. The "skies are free" was seen as the
symbol of the benefits which now would flow to the travelling public, with opportunities for
new airlines to enter the market and compete on price and quality. One airline, Compass
Airlines Pty Ltd, was prepared for entry well before November 1990; its Chairman had an
extensive knowledge of the two major incumbent operators, Australian and Ansett, and was an
owner of a niche market airline, East-West Airlines, before selling it to Ansett.
Compass Airlines was heralded into the market as the people's airline, funded by public
subscription, and offering both low fares and high quality service in modern Airbus equipment,
servicing the major capitals of Australia. Almost exactly one year on, with no other new
entrants, Compass ceased operations. As the first and only new entrant into the market, the
debate on the future of Compass aroused intense public interest and there has been a concern
by some that this spelt the end of economic deregulation, with a return to higher air fares.
Many have asked why Compass should be allowed to be liquidated when it has been the
instrument of opportunities for travel, the argument being that the Federal Government should
provide financial support because of the benefits derived from economic deregulation.
This paper presents and analyses the evidence and arguments about the collapse of Compass
Airlines, focusing attention on the workability of deregulation and on the lessons to be learned
by new entrants.  The paper is organised as follows. We briefly outline the background to the
formation of Compass Airlines, followed by a sketch of the domestic aviation market prior to
and during the period of Compass's operation. The events leading up to the formation of
Compass are documented together with a clear statement on the performance of Compass
throughout 1991. The collapse of the airline is evaluated from a number of perspectives,
notably barriers to entry, competitive strategy, and Compass management. The paper looks in
some depth at the controversy over the impact that access to suitable terminals had on the
demise of Compass. We conclude with a brief look at the future and new entrants.
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2. BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF
COMPASS AIRLINES                                
Domestic aviation in Australia has gone from a tightly regulated, but stable, industry to a
deregulated one.  In the space of one year, the industry has been cut loose from stringent
controls and has seen a serious attempt at entry only to result in financial failure.  The history
of the regulated industry and the legislation applying to it are documented in Brodgen (1968),
Richardson and Poulton (1968) and Davies (1971). To set the background for investigating
the Compass collapse we summarise the circumstances which enabled the two incumbent
airlines to establish a power base, even in the deregulated regime.
(i) A brief history of the Two Airline Policy (TAP)                 
In its infancy, the Australian airline industry consisted of subsidised small operators servicing
regional markets.  After its formation in 1929, Australian National Airways (ANA), with
financial backing of shipping interests, began to expand its sphere of operations to the stage
where it appeared that a natural monopoly would emerge on the national network.  The
Labor Government of the day, motivated by a suspicion that monopolistic practices prevalent
in shipping would spread to this new and strategic industry, preferred that the public interest
be protected through government ownership and unsuccessfully attempted to nationalise
aviation.  Its next option was to commence its own airline, known for most of its life as Trans
Australia Airlines (TAA) and changing to Australian Airlines prior to deregulation.
TAA clearly set out to defeat its private sector rival in the commercial aréna, helped along by
whatever support the Government could provide.  However, with the election of the pro-
business Menzies Government in 1951, aviation policy underwent a sharp change.  Still
embracing the view that, left to itself, the industry would be controlled by a single airline, the
new Government set out to preserve two main airlines, ANA and TAA.  The two airline
policy thus emerged in 1952 in the form of an Agreement, enshrined under an Act of
Parliament, which required the two airlines and the Government to act according to a set of
market rules.  However, smaller airlines continued to compete freely in interstate services and
eventually Ansett Airlines succeeded in taking over its larger rival, ANA.  Ansett then
became the private sector partner in the two airline policy and quickly moved to take over all
of its smaller rivals of any consequence.
The Airlines agreement Act and associated  legislation effectively introduced economic
regulation of entry to the industry, entry and exit for routes, capacity and fares and required
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the airlines to consult on many important areas of commercial importance.   The Government
protected the two major airlines by making it impossible for a would–be competitor to import
suitable aircraft, and it further exempted the airlines from the fair competition requirements
of the Trade Practices Act.
The two airline policy was remarkably resilient lasting 38 years.  It was amended in 1961,
1972, 1978 and 1981 before the Government announced in 1987 that it would be terminating
the Airlines Agreement in October 1990.  Of the amendments, the 1981 Act allowed scope
for regional airlines to expand on non-trunk routes and permitted them to import jet aircraft
where a need could be demonstrated.  This concession paved the way for East-West Airlines
to move beyond its traditional market in New South Wales.  It quickly earned a reputation
for its aggressive and innovative approach to competition and gave consumers a taste of
what might be possible in a fully deregulated market.  When a major review of airline policy
was undertaken in 1985, there were widespread calls for economic deregulation.
As a result of this public disquiet about the Two-Airline Policy, the Minister of Transport
and Telecommunications announced that regulation of the domestic airline industry would
lapse on 1 November 1990 with the abandonment of the TAP.  An opportunity for new
entrants was created and Compass Airlines was spawned out of this environment.
(ii) The Economic Effects of TAP                                      
The effect of the TAP was a static industry, dominated by Ansett and Australian, who both
secured about half the passenger numbers on the major trunk routes.  Forsyth and Hocking
(1978) presented a thorough-going analysis of the economic effects of the regulatory
instruments that kept the TAP in place. With two virtually identical competitors, competition
in the industry became peripheral. The two airlines settled into "a quiet life duopoly" (Kirby
1987). Costs were bloated, fleet selection was sub-optimal, labour was highly unionised and
powerful, and most of these "X-inefficiency" costs were passed on to the consumer in the
form of higher fares.
The most important restrictions related to entry, capacity and load factors, price control and
the nature of competition.
(a) Entry
Entry into trunk routes and the interstate domestic aviation industry were perhaps the most
important restrictions imposed by successive Federal governments.  The main trunk routes
were reserved for Ansett and Australian.  Restriction on entry was backed by controls on the
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importation of new aircraft.  It was this control on entry that underpinned the rationale for
other restrictions (Forsyth and Hocking, 1978).
(b) Capacity and Load Factors
Every year, the incumbents and the Department of Transport set the levels on the estimated
volume of passenger and freight traffic for competitive routes for the following year at given
tariff levels.  This was called Determination and the duopolists were allowed to schedule
total capacity on all routes such that average load factors would be 65%, a utilisation rate
considered to be commercially viable.  If the load factors rose above 65%, then the
Department of Transport allowed an increase in capacity after consultation between the
airlines. These controls on capacity were a perfect recipe for "a quiet life duopoly" and meant
that "chiselling" by any of the majors was counter-productive.  The airlines did not seriously
engage in schedule competition and profitability was more or less guaranteed.
(c) Price Control
Price controls were not so explicit, but there was a requirement that firms would not be able
to maintain profits above "a reasonable level" for an extended period as this would require
tighter price controls.  When profits at the then existing levels of "efficiency factor prices and
fares" were falling below the "reasonable level", the two airlines would apply for increases
which they would normally be granted.  Fare increase applications were premised on cost-
plus pricing, which allowed for x-inefficiency costs to be passed on to the consumer.
(d) Competition
The degree of rivalry in the industry was limited.  Only in some limited respects were Ansett
and Australian genuinely competitive.  An example of this limited competition can be
witnessed in their parallel schedules.  In a fully collusive oligopoly or monopoly, the
participants would offer non-parallel flights. The very existence of a "rationalisation
committee provided a forum at which the airlines could agree to cut down "costly"
competition.  There was also collusion on the levels of capacity provided on routes and on
the timing of the introduction of new aircraft (Forsyth and Hocking, 1978).
(e) Inefficiency and High Fares
The most salient weakness of the TAP was the absence of incentives to improve efficiency,
to reduce costs, given the cost-plus basis for fare setting, the constraints on competition and
the fact that employing more labour would give an urge to one airline as it could provide
better service quality.  Formby et al. (1990)  compared the operating performance of airlines
subject to differing degrees of economic regulation and came up with persuasive evidence
that regulation produces consistently higher costs, lower productivity, higher fares, fewer
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discounts and a more limited choice of services than would result in a more competitive
environment.  Regulation weakens the incentives to improve economic efficiency and
generates incentives for cost-padding.  The regulations themselves introduce inflexibilities
and a degree of arbitrariness in the allocation of services and the setting of fares.
In Australia, regulation raised prices well above the market clearing level, hence few
people could afford air travel before deregulation.  The effect of the TAP and its attendant
restrictions on entry, capacity and by extension fixing fares above the market-clearing level
are captured in Figure 1.
Ptap
PO
Q1  Q3  Q0 Q2
SupplyDemand
D
BA
C
Figure 1.
The Economic Effects of Restrictions on Entry and Service Provision
At a price Ptap, the two airlines would have wanted to supply quantity Q2.  But his was
above the market clearing Quantity Q0 and the market-clearing price P0.  Consumers could
only afford quantity Q1 at Price Ptap.  At Price Ptap, the loss of consumer surplus is  A + B.
Given the presence of capacity and load factor determination, the two majors were able to
supply at Q3.  The trapezoid "D" represents the cost of superfluous output (x-inefficiency)
i.e. slack capacity that the consumers had to pay for in price Ptap.  The r ctangle Q1 to Q0
including triangle C represents the stimulatory effect of reducing the price from Ptap to th
market clearing price of P0.
There was no incentive under TAP to produce efficiently. Forsyth (1987) has argued that
regulation made the domestic aviation industry both allocatively and productively inefficient:
"If as the May Committee argued (May Report 1986), the Australian
industry is not offering enough products at the low fare/low quality end of
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the market, which consumers will be willing to pay for, it is allocat vely
inefficient and where prices are above or b low the marginal costs of
supplying the products, then there is allocative inefficiency.",
(Forsyth, 1987, p. 101)
It is against this background of inefficient production and allocation by the aviation industry,
that the success or otherwise of deregulation and new entrants is to be judged.  An objective
of deregulation is to induce improved economic performance through competition.
Competition, acting  as a restraint on firms should restrict their ability to set prices well above
marginal costs, to produce the wrong services and to produce inefficiently.  Such competition
could come as a result of a large number of firms in the market, the ease of entry and/or exit
of firms from the market and the threat of potential entry.
(iii) The Government's Intention in Deregulating
Domestic Aviation                                                        
In its plans to deregulate the domestic aviation industry, the Federal government had to
dismantle the TAP and by so doing its undesirable economic effects on the industry that we
have already alluded to.  Its intentions  were:
• no capacity constraints were to apply to airlines on trunk routes
• no control on prices unless these were anticompetitive
• no barriers to ownership status save for foreign equity which was to be subject to
general foreign investment guidelines as outlined by the Foreign Investment
Review Board
• no constraints on new domestic operators or their entry onto trunk routes
• maintenance of the then existing Civil Aviation Authority safety standards
• Qantas to regain interlining rights from July 1988, but no other foreign airline to
be given any domestic rights
• Complete relaxation of restrictions on charter flights
• guaranteed access for new entrants to domestic airport terminals and
• involvement of the Trade Practice Commission and the Price Surveillance
Authority as the industry watchdogs
 (Access Research, 1989).
The anticipated benefits of deregulation were four fold:
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(i) providing greater incentives for Ansett and Australian to be more efficient and to
respond more flexibly to consumer needs
(ii) to bring about a wider range of fares especially discounted fares
(iii) to ensure continued and stronger growth in leisure travel and more access to
flying by Australians, and
(iv) to offer greater variety in types and standards of services provided by the airlines.
Whilst the government's intentions are clear, the collapse of Compass Airlines has put into
question the sincerity of these desires and in particular the way the government implemented
policy.  This issue will be examined in greater detail in a later section. Having established the
Federal Government's intentions, we now briefly examine the domestic aviation market just
before and soon after deregulation.  This is followed by a look at the formation of Compass
and its performance in the year of its operation. There are some generic strategies which new
entrants could adopt  which are of necessity going to relate to the market structure and the
behavioural exigencies that the structure circumscribes for firms (Brown, 1989).
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3. THE DOMESTIC AVIATION MARKET - A
BRIEF SKETCH                                       
(i) Industry Structure                                                         
Classical micro-economic theory argues that the degree of competition in an industry is
largely the function of market structure.  Firm concentration as measured by the standard
industrial classification index (SIC) measures the amount of rivalry in an industry.  Theories
of competition and business strategy have largely taken up the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm to explain competitive behaviour within the market in contrast to
competition for the market (i.e. contestability).  Porter's (1980) competitive strategies for
instance are based on the structural analysis of industry.  The structural determinants of
rivalry are:
• the number of competitors in the industry
• the degree of new entry in the industry
• the strength of industry demand
• the degree of excess (slack) capacity
• the homogeneity of firm's cost structures, technology in use and the size of firms
• barriers to entry and exit, and
• the degree of fixed or sunk costs.
In the Australian domestic aviation market, the major players on the trunk routes prior to
deregulation were Ansett and Australian.  Eastwest, owned by TNT - the parent group of
Ansett - concentrated on selected routes, mostly the niche leisure market. With the statutory
three years notice of the termination of the two airline policy (TAP), Ansett and Australian
started to prepare themselves for 1990 and took pre-emptive action on a number of fronts.
Before Compass' entry, the market was characterised by concentration where Ansett and its
associates dominated with a 59% share of the passenger numbers uplifted, compared to
Australian's 44% on major trunk routes  (Baussman, 1989).  Australian had a stronger focus
on the trunk routes, whereas Ansett, while equally strong on the trunk routes, was even more
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strongly represented on regional routes.  While the Ansett group held 55% of the domestic
uplift (DOTC, 1990), it flew unopposed by Australian on many regional routes.  Where there
was direct competition with Australian on trunk routes, Australian had the edge since 1984 in
both passenger numbers and fare values paid (DOTC, 1990).  Figure 2 shows the relative
market shares in December 1990 and a year later in December 1991.
December 1990 December 1991
Australian
44%
Ansett NT 1.5%Ansett WA 4%
Ansett Express 4.5%
Eastwest 5%
Ansett 41%
Australian
43%
Ansett 38%
Eastwest 7%
Compass 1.5%
Ansett NT 1%
Ansett Express 5.5%
Ansett WA 4% |
Figure 2.  How Deregulation has Changed Market Shares
(Passenger Uplift - DOTC figures December 1990).
The ownership structures of both majors is summarised in Figure 3. The Ansett group
comprises Ansett Australia, and the regional airlines:  Ansett Express, Ansett WA, Ansett
NT and the leisure airline Eastwest.  Australian owns Sunstate Airlines (Qld), Sunstate
Airline Mildura, Australian Regional Airlines and holds 42% of Eastern Australian Airlines.
It also has a close commercial relationship with Hazelton Airlines.  A number of other smaller
operators make up the regional market sector.
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Australian
50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
TNT NEWS CORP
AUSTRALIAN AIRLINES
Australian Regional Airlines Pty Ltd (100%)
Ansett 
Transport
Moael 
Pty Ltd
Bodas 
Pty Ltd
Ansett Australia
Ansett Express
Ansette WA
Ansett NT
Eastwest Airlines 
(100%)
Skywest Airlines 
(100%)
Kendall Airlines 
(100%)
Aeropelican  
Air Services Pty Ltd 
(100%)
Sunstate Airlines Qld Pty Ltd (100%)
Sunstate Airlines (Mildura) Pty Ltd (100%)
Australian Regional Airline (Qld) (100%)
Eastern Australian Airline (100%)
Air Queensland Pty Ltd (100%)
Australia Airline Pty Ltd (100%)
Ansett
Figure 3.  Ownership Structures of the Majors
                                                                                                            
                                      3. THE DOMESTIC AVIATION MARKET - A
 Institute of Transport Studies   13
The major airlines had strong links with the travel industry, a number  of resorts and hotels,
car rental companies, retail chains and tour wholesalers. Figure 4 summarises the relative
affiliations and ownerships.
Facilities
Owned/Aligned Ansett Australian
1. Hotels & Resorts Gateway Hotels Bedarra Island
Hamilton Island Brampton Island
Hayman Island Dunk Island
South Molle Island Great Keppel Island
Southern Pacific Hotels Corp.Hilton
Lizard Island
Sheraton
Whitsundays
Wilderness Lodge
2. Coach Companies Bus Australia Pioneer
Pioneer Newmans
3. Car Rental Companies Avis Hertz
Trans-National Transport Budget
4. Tour Wholesalers Ansett Holidays Australian Holidays
    (owned/aligned) Destination Australia Jetset
Traveland
5. Retail Chains ANZ Travel Own outlets (53)
    (owned) Coles-Myer Ansett Travel Australian Airlines
Concorde Travel Westpac Travel
David Jones Travel
Elders IXL Travel
Show Travel
Steward Moffat
Traveland
6. Retail Chains Jayes Travel American Express
    (aligned) Metro Travel Group Harvey World
Own outlets (54) Jetset
Thomas Cook National Travel
Traveland Coles-Myer Thomas Cook
Wiandana TTP Travelstrength
UnitedTrav.Ag. Gp
7. Consolidations Metro Travel Concorde
    (CRS system preferred)Ansamatic Galileo
Southern Cross/Travelex Southern Cross
8. Other Affiliations/ Aero Pelican British Airways
   alignments Ansett NZ Air New Zealand
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Ansett Wridgeways Singapore Airlines
Concorde UTA
Diners Club Canadian Airlines
Eastwest
Kennards
Overseas Airlines Source: King (1991)
TNT Group
Figure 4.  Trade Industry Alignments and Affiliations in Australia
Prior to deregulation, Australian had a stronger focus on the business traveller market.  This
was due partly to the availability of business class seating and the targeting by the airline for
these high yield passengers.  Ansett until late 1990 did not offer a business class equivalent to
compete with Australian.
Fleet numbers and type play an important role in determining the routes and market segments
that a carrier can compete in effectively.  Aircraft type dictates the minimum route density
that can be serviced while being able to maintain profitable load factors and the requisite
service frequency.  Larger planes are less cost effective on an available seat kilometre cost
basis on thinner routes but are more profitable on denser routes.  Both Ansett and Australian
began a large scale re-equipping programme before deregulation, updating their fleets so as
to achieve operating economies and to enhance service levels for the lucrative business travel
market. This timing was also designed to preserve "fighting funds" for use in the early days
of deregulation.
(ii) Raising the Barriers to Entry
Repositioning by Incumbents Prior to Deregulation            
The three years notice of the termination of the TAP gave  incumbents ample time to prepare
for deregulation and to take pre-emptive action, to reduce the risk of entry to them on the
trunk route network. There is a common thread that runs through most of the strategies that
the incumbents adopted on the dawn of deregulation.  Of special interest:
• both concentrated on building a strong and secure market base before
deregulation.  They began a quick retreat from routes that would not be viable
and they went from servicing 95 airports to 68, leaving the abandoned routes
open to commuter or regional operators (Sandilands, 1991).
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• Australian embarked on a staff rationalisation campaign, aiming to reduce its staff
numbers by 1000.  This rationalisation continued even after deregulation with
voluntary redundancies being offered.  Ansett was more secretive about its staff
reductions, preferring to use natural attrition and staff redeployment techniques.
• The pilots' dispute which effectively closed-down the airlines for 6 months
offered an opportunity to trim pilot numbers and served notice that the airlines
would take a tough stand in industrial relations.
• There was a heightened sense of urgency by both majors to become flexible
enough to react to any competitive contingency if needed, to ensure that they
were able to protect their business traveller customer base, and to change their
internal systems to relate to new authorities (Access Research, 1989).
• Both airlines slightly altered their pricing strategies. They ran advertising
campaigns offering discounts on selected routes with some conditions. For
example, there were discounts of up to 45% off the economy fare, special
discounts for specific market segments such as the over-60s,  and off-peak, late
evening and night flight discounts were introduced.  The Perth to eastern capitals
routes were targeted since these had historically been highly priced and offered
the most marketing impact in terms of absolute fare reductions.
• Ties with commuter airlines were strengthened in a bid to secure passenger feed
from intra-state routes and to provide a low cost option for serving thin routes
and to forestall commuter airlines from upgrading themselves to trunk
competitors after deregulation.
• Yield management systems were upgraded so as to improve the information data
base for management decisions and the targeting of markets effectively.  Both
joined the Galileo Computer Reservation System (CRS) and in so doing,
established it as the pre-eminent CRS for the domestic market.
• The incumbents strengthened ties with travel agents, hotels and car hire firms.
For instance, Ansett acquired Traveland, ANZ Travel and formed a partnership
with Coles-Myer to establish the Coles-Myer Ansett travel agency.  It  has
preferred carrier status with MetroTravel.  In addition, Ansett offered to cover
merchant fees for major credit cards and offered a 10% override payment to
agents to use a selected credit card (Harrington, 1991).  Earlier, Australian had
offered passengers the payment of merchant fees when American Express credit
is used for the ticket purchase.  Australian also acquired Westpac Travel as well
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as having already  enjoyed a longer and better association with most travel
agents.
There were also some strategies that each of the majors adopted that have not been
mimicked exactly by the other. Ansett introduced a substantial discount fare structure
offering a wide range of fares and services specifically aimed at moving the airline from its
past business passenger focus to serve the entire market including leisure-travel. This
involved a finer segmentation of the market by retaining some conditions on discount fares so
as to minimise spillage from business travellers onto its leisure market offers, and offered
business class initiatives such as two abreast first class style.  Eastwest increased its focus on
the leisure market.
Australian concentrated on developing a wider market appeal, especially expanding its
penetration of leisure travel, while still retaining its strong focus on the business travel
centre. It reduced six-across business class seating to 4 seats and opened an airport
conference centre at Melbourne.  In 1990, Australian developed new fare structures in an
effort to maintain market dominance under deregulation, based on market research and the
use of a yield management system.  The airline claimed that its yield management system
enabled it to pinpoint "soft spots" in the network and to provide products which maximised
revenue on those routes.  Australian opened more overseas offices, taking the number to 13
offices, 9 general sales offices and a number of general sales agents.  It expected this strategy
to increase its market of inbound visitors from 10% to 20-25% within the next five years.
These initiatives were targeted at the Asian countries such as South Korea, Thailand and
Taiwan.
The net effect of the incumbents’ strategies was to raise barriers to entry.  But the most
significant firm-created barrier to entry and one that was to shape the nature of competition
in a deregulated environment relates to terminal leases extended to the incumbents. In
December 1987, just before the handover of airport management to the Federal Airports
Corporation (FAC), the Federal Government and the incumbents renegotiated leases for
terminal facilities at Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide, Launceston and Coolangatta
airports.  The new lease conditions for Sydney also covered expansion land around the
existing terminals, with the term for Sydney leases being 20 years for the premises and eight
years for the expansion land where it has been developed (BTCE, 1991a).The Federal
Government required the incumbents to provide gates at their terminals to new entrants, two
each at Sydney and Melbourne, one each at Adelaide, Perth and Coolangatta and one at
Launceston by Ansett only.  These leases have been widely criticised on the grounds that
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they have given Ansett and Australian considerable market power.  We examine the issue of
terminal leases in greater detail in a later section.
The firm-created barriers to entry raised the stakes for intending new entrants and the
competitive strategies they could use were circumscribed.  Starting from scratch in
Australia's commercial aviation environment placed Compass at a distinct disadvantage.  Not
only was there the question of adequate funding in terms of start-up costs, but also the need
to provide for long term losses and "fighting funds" in order to survive the retaliatory
pressures from incumbent airlines.  Besides, global demand for new or leased aircraft was
bullish when deregulation came into force.  The new entrants had to invest heavily in
advertising, not only of their products, but corporate identity, building awareness, image
development and route promotion.
(iii) Possible Strategies For Entrants
(Given the Barriers to Entry)                                        
In a study completed for the Australian Federation of Travel Agents, Access Research (1989)
argued that new entrants would have to stay small and low priced for the business market on
major trunk routes and to concentrate on niche marketing and the development of new
routes.  Success would depend on the creation and servicing of new market niches, operating
around the majors (flanking strategy), and to forge links with international airlines so as to
tap the inbound tourism market.  The convention market was also identified as a profitable
niche.  Above all, Access Research believed that the new entrants would have to stay low
cost with a low investment intensity.
The simplest strategy open to new entrants was that of undercutting the majors' fares.  But
the US experience of such airlines as People's Express showed that price cutting, on its own,
is problematic.  A cost leadership strategy (whose focus in essence is to compete on price as
the major marketing tool) is not appropriate where there is actual or perceived
product/service parity and channels of distribution are critical factors for competitive
advantage. Brown (1989) considers a "head-on strategy" with a direct frontal attack to beat
the competitor through sheer force.  This is risky strategy and it requires good
products/services, heavy marketing support and substantial financial resources to enable a
prolonged counter-attack by competitors to be rebuffed.  A relative advantage in resources,
commitment and management focus is required to win a head-on encounter.  It would appear
that Compass to an extent chose this strategy but had none of the requisite resources needed
to win.
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4. ENTER COMPASS!
ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE FIRST
TWELVE MONTHS                                  
Compass Airlines was the first entrant and the first casualty of the deregulated domestic
aviation environment.  It is necessary to analyse the history of its operations in the first
twelve months if its performance is to be fairly evaluated.  Such a longitudinal approach will
help us understand what went wrong with Compass in its maiden year. The Compass
calendar, a chronology of the major events and fare initiatives, is given in Appendix A.
(i) Formation of Compass - the Planning Stages, and Strategies
Chosen                                                                   
Compass Holdings Limited was incorporated on 2 July 1987, with its prime objective to
establish and operate an Australian domestic airline through its wholly owned subsidiary
Compass Airlines Pty Limited (Ferrier, 1992).  The main motivation for its formation was
that the Chairman, Bryan Grey felt that there was room to under-cut the incumbents - whose
efficiency had become impaired under the protection of the TAP.  The pilots dispute also left
some residual ill-feeling in the market place about Ansett and Australian.
To finance the company, Bryan Grey initially had a figure of $100 million in mind, but failed
to convince investors about the viability of such a venture, and went down to $85 million,
still seeking placement with institutional investors. He failed to get this support and finally
had to settle for a public flotation of $50 million underwritten by Potter Partners
Underwriters Limited.  In the event, $65 million was raised from the public, as well as $5
million of shares issued to C. Bryan Grey.  The table showing equity participation appears in
Appendix 2.
(a) Mission Statement and Market Positioning
The Chairman of Compass in his letter to shareholders spelt out the strategy and market
positioning of Compass vis-a-vis its competitors.
"Compass is designed to operate on an efficient cost structure
stemming from its one aircraft type operation and in particular the
operation of five large aircraft servicing only seven major airports.
Compass is largely targeting an incremental market generated by its
lower fare structure." 
(Compass Prospectus,
1990)
4. ENTER COMPASS!
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(b) Proposed Strategies at its Formation
An important question is whether Compass' demise was due to inadequate strategy
formulation or a failure to stick to its proposed strategies. On formation, its fleet and rou e
portfolio involved operating five single class Airbus aircraft between Sydney, Melbourne,
Adelaide, Perth, Brisbane, Coolangatta and Cairns.  The routes were perceived as offering
the greatest profit potential and public recognition and they had the highest densities. The
market segments and schedules  considered on the major trunk routes in Australia were
peak business traffic (7am - 9am and 4pm - 9pm), off-peak schedule operations (9am - 4pm),
and curfew or back of the clock (9 pm - 7am). The pricing policy for each segment was
intended to penetrate these markets with the following fares:
• Peak and Off-Peak fares: - 80% of the then current standard economy fare
offered by Ansett and Australian.
• Curfew fares: - 50% of the then current standard economy fares of the majors
and
• Curfew services to be offered on the Sydney - Perth, Melbourne - Perth and
Melbourne - Cairns routes.
The pricing strategy was premised on the assumption that the majors were limited in their
ability to match the Compass offers since their cost structures were supposedly higher. Their
uncompetitive operating costs were supposedly emanating from mixed aircraft fleets,
complex rostering systems, multiple crew locations and aircraft types with higher operating
costs than Compass' on a per seat kilometre basis.  The pilots' dispute had already cost the
incumbents dearly; Australian Airlines alone was reported to have lost more than $150
million as a result of the dispute.  It was also projected that Ansett and Australian would be
limited in their ability to subsidise discounting on the major routes entered by increasing fares
on the routes on which Compass would not compete.
(c) Operations Planning
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Compass was involved in aircraft lease negotiations even before obtaining an Air Operators
Certificate. It succeeded in securing operating leases for Airbus aircraft with Polaris Holding
Company (a subsidiary of General Electric (USA)), Monarch Airlines (UK) and Canadian
Airlines (Canada). The Airbus A300 - 600R aircraft requires two flight crew and 8 cabin
staff.  On the basis of five aircraft, Compass was to employ a flight crew and cabin staff of
232.  It had a target of 690 annual hours of flight crew utilisation.  The flight and cabin crew
were to be based in Melbourne.
Maximum use of traffic employees was planned in off-peak periods by giving them the
responsibility for processing documentation after aircraft departures, thus eliminating the
need to transfer documentation to accounting departments.  Multiskilling is a sensible policy
for a start-up.  All technical maintenance work was to be contracted out to Hawker Pacific
Pty Ltd who would perform it at Brisbane Airport in a hangar complex constructed by
Compass.  The contracting out of jobs was a strategy to limit capital requirements (and
perhaps to provide flexibility for expansion).
Compass chose the SABRE computer reservation system developed by American Airlines
which is used and marketed in Australia by Qantas under the name "Fantasia". It was
reluctant to use the Galileo system that was being used by the majors. Compass "chose" to be
a sub-lessee of Australian for terminal access at Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide.
Negotiations for terminal access at Perth were unsuccessful.  At Brisbane it used FAC
facilities and at Cairns the Airport Authority also provided terminal facilities.  The
opportunity to lease terminal facilities, albeit inferior space in the view of Compass, rather
than having to build them has been argued by Compass as a major reason for its collapse.
This competitive disadvantage needs to be evaluated against the financial benefit gained by
not having to invest in its own terminal.
(d) Financial Forecasts
Perhaps the most important selling point of the prospectus and the culmination of all the
planning since the formation of Compass Airlines was the financial forecast.  This was
premised on the then on-going negotiations between Compass and various outside parties
and they assumed the following:
- the issue of an Air Operators Certificate
- the lease of five Airbus A300-600R aircraft in accordance with the timetable
agreed to
4. ENTER COMPASS!
                                                                                                            
                                          ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE FIRST 
 Institute of Transport Studies   21
- the continuation of the executive service agreement with C. Bryan Grey
- crew productivity and rostering out of Melbourne
- maintenance based in Brisbane and sub-contracted to Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd
- use of the SABRE reservation system and
- FAC approval of terminal access.
 Commencing in 1991, an average passenger load factor of 60% with no growth in market
share or load factors over the forecast period of five years was assumed. Fares were to be
discounted to 80% for the peak and off-peak, and 50% for the curfew of the majors'
undiscounted standard economy fares ruling at any particular date of operation. A dividend
payout policy of 75% of retentions at each semi-annual dividend payment was planned
together with a debt-equity ratio after June 1991 of no more than 30%.
Arthur Anderson and Co, independent Chartered Accountants agreed with Compass'
forecasts, stating:
"We believe a forecasted average passenger load factor of 60% is
reasonable and based on the recent high load factor achieved
throughout the industry; the strategy of operating only on major
trunk routes; the discount pricing strategy and the choice of aircraft."
(Compass Prospectus, 1990, pp.27)
(ii) Financial Performance in the
12 Months of Operation                                                
The Ferrier Hodgson and Co's "Provisional Liquidator's Statement to Interested Parties",
dated 8 January 1992 gives a holistic picture of Compass' financial performance for the
twelve months ended 20 December 1991.  Given that Compass was only into its first year of
operation, any comparisons with past performance (trend analysis) or with other companies
in the industry (inter-company comparisons) are precluded.  The only realistic yardstick for
measuring its performance is to use the financial forecasts as presented in the Prospectus.
We therefore compare the forecast revenue in the prospectus with the actual results as at the
end of November 1991 (Table 1).  Figures for the twenty days of operations in December
are not yet publicly available.
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Table 1. Comparison of Actual Financial Results with Forecasts
Financial Year Financial Year Operations Year
1990/91 1991/92 Average (Actual)
Prospectus Actual Prospectus Actual Actual
to Nov 1991
$M $M $M $M $M
Load Factor 60% 57% 60% 74% 66%
Yield $184 $150 $191 $113 $132
Revenue $153 $ 72 $372 $ 97 $ 85
Source:  Ferrier Hodgson and Co; 1992.
Despite better than forecast load factors, Compass' yield was eroded by deep discounting.
Trading losses for the year of operations amounted to $43.2 million:
$M
Trading loss from 1 Dec 1990 to 30/06/91 16.5
Trading loss from 1 July 1991 to 30/11/91 26.2
Bad debts as at 30/11/91  0.5
43.2
Source:  Ferrier Hodgson and Co; 1992.
The forecast profits for the year of operations was $72.451 million compared to an operating
loss of $43.2 million.The liquidators prepared a statement of assets and liabilities as at 20
December 1991, in two formats;  one with Compass as a going concern and, second with
Compass as a ceased business (Table 2).
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Table 2. Compass as a Going Concern and a Ceased Business.
Going Concern         Ceased Bus.
Values Values
Assets $M $M
Sundry debtors - trade 3.3 3.3
- Australian Airlines 5.1 5.1
- Security deposit 1.6 1.6
Inventory - Stock and Spares 8.2 8.2
- equity in Airbus parts 5.3 0.0
Furniture, Plant & Equipment 5.4 5.4
Leasehold Improvements 1.8 1.8
Prepayments 8.5 8.5
Equity in Leased Plant & Equipment 3.9 3.9
Deferred Expenditure
- current 7.5 0.0
- pre-operating 8.3 0.0
- routes establishment 14.1 0.0
- training 5.5 0.0
Cash on deposit as security for
-   aircraft lease 19.6 19.6
-   aircraft purchase/lease 7.7                             7.7
105.8 65.1
Liabilities $M $M
Employees Claims
- Wages & holiday pay 2.2 2.2
- redundancy & termination pay 0.0 4.6
Deputy Commission of Taxation 1.8 1.8
Computers under Lease 0.0 1.2
Aircraft Engines Under Lease 0.0 1.5
Unsecured Creditors
- unearned revenue 38.0 38.0
- Compass Holding Ltd 70.0 70.0
- FAC/CAA 17.0 17.0
- others 22.0 22.0
Estimated Damages - Aircraft Leases Cancelled 0.0 59.0
Estimated Damages - if Plane Purchase Orders Cancelled             0.0                           19.0
151.0 236.3
Estimated Deficiency of Assets to Meet Liabilities 45.2 171.2
Source: Ferrier, 1992   
As a business venture, Compass failed dismally as reflected in some selected financial ratios.
The ratio of sales to total assets (or the productivity ratio) is an indicator of how the
company is turning over its assets and the margin it makes on each sale. Anything less than
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one indicates that the company's asset utilisation is below par.  Using the 30 June 1991
figures (because of the unavailability of the asset figures as at 20/12/91), the ratio was 0.51
(= 70.944M/136.691M).
The ratio of earnings (before interest and taxes) to salesindicates the margin the
company is making in sales.  For Compass this ratio as at 20/12/91 was - 0.256 (=-
43.2M/169M). The  margin was actually negative, primarily because of the heavy
discounting wars.  A low asset turnover ratio and a low profit margin is a fatal combination;
a higher asset turnover might in some cases compensate for lower profit margins - as is
usually the case in the retail business. There are many other financial ratios that would
indicate poor performance on the part of Compass, but we have seen ample evidence that
Compass' financial performance was not satisfactory.
(iii) Other Performance Indicators - Operations, Market Share and
Service                                                                   
It is too harsh to evaluate Compass’ performance simply on the basis of the bottom line.  The
entry of Compass saw a substantial change in the structure and operations of the Australian
domestic airline industry.  To some extent, it provided greater flexibility in areas such as
pricing and route structure. The structure and level of operating costs has changed since
economic deregulation, especially after Compass' entry.  Costs have been cut by such
initiatives as reduction in staff numbers at Australian and Ansett as both have sought
productivity increases.  The majors have been forced to rationalise their fleet selection
procedures; Australian for instance has sold off its vintage B727-100 aircraft and it claims to
be achieving better aircraft utilisation.
The entry of Compass and the new competitive regime introduced heterogeneity in services
offered and increased capacity but, with yields driven down, the players had to consider
cutting costs.  The Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE, 1991) in
its report on the first year of deregulation claims that Compass had a distinct cost advantage
over its competitors. This was a commendable performance, but one that does not
necessarily guarantee sustenance as was demonstrated in the USA.
(a) Compass' Cost Advantage
The BTCE  estimated that Compass' direct operating costs were 5.3c per available seat
kilometre (ASK) compared to the majors 8.5c per ASK (BTCE 1991).  The longer average
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stage distance and the economies of operating larger aircraft were all factors that imparted
Compass with its cost advantage.  Table 3 summarises the estimated direct operating costs
for Compass and the majors.
Table 3.Estimates of Direct Operating Costs for Compass and 
the Main Incumbents (cents per ASK).
Compass
Base Utilisation Stage Average Incumbents
(Compass) (Majors)
Capital 1.36 1.74 1.81 1.64 1.56
Fuel 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.88
Maintenance 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.90 1.64
Crew 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.74
Government 1.44 1.44 1.60 1.49 1.90
Other 0.56 0.56 0.70 0.61 1.55
Total 5.26 5.65 6.11 5.69 8.52
Source:  BTCE, 1991a
The incumbents  had a comparative advantage only as far as capital costs were concerned.  In
terms of direct operating cost components, Compass' aircraft had higher capital costs per
seat kilometre than incumbent airlines (because they are newer), but were much more fuel
efficient and less costly to maintain.  Cost data, whilst useful as far as analysing the validity
of Compass' competitive strategy, has to be set against revenue-earning performance.  In the
USA, the new entrant airlines possessed many cost advantages over the established airlines
(Bailey, 1985), but these were not sufficient to outweigh the other advantages of the
established airlines, in the longer run.
Although Compass had a cost advantage conferred to it by its aircraft size on the routes that
it competed, Australian and Ansett also used their Airbuses on the same routes.  The majors'
strategies therefore dampened Compass' cost advantage. The incumbents also had larger
networks and thus reaped economies of scope, scale and administration.  Their higher
frequencies, more flight connections and generally better scheduling attracted "pin-stripe"
traffic, which although more costly to service, translates to a higher yield revenue for only
marginal increases in costs.
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Figure 5. Composition of Compass Airlines Direct Operating Costs
Aircraft lease payments, constituting the largest direct operating cost (Figure 5), were a
serious drain on Compass' cash as they were paid on a monthly basis. Although Compass
was able to cover its direct operating costs, it was not able to cover total average costs
(Figure 6).  The graph below shows how Compass' revenues fell short. The decline in
profitability was reflected in a deteriorating yield despite an improving load factor and
passenger numbers uplifted.  The operating profit in June 1991 was an aberration that can be
attributed to Compass' decision to capitalise route establishment costs which amounted to
$13 million.
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Figure 6. Compass' Operational Performance: Operating Profits and Contribution to
Indirect Operating Costs and Overheads (Dec 1990 to Nov 1991)
(b) Passenger Uplift and Load Factors
Figure 7 gives the load factor growth on a monthly basis from 1 December 1990 to 30
September 1991. Up to 30 June 1991, Compass carried 510,000 sector passengers at an
average load factor of 61% and, for the five months to 30 November 1991, 835,000
passengers were carried at an average load factor of 74%, all above the prospectus forecast
of 60%. It would have been desirable to compare Compass performance  with that of the
majors but load factors nationally are aggregated. Despite the high loading, Compass' fare
discounting eroded passenger yields and thus profitability.
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Figure 7. Compass Load Factor: December 1990 - September 1991
Source:  Compass Annual Report for the Year ended 30/06/91.
 With an optimal pricing regime in place, an increase in load factor should translate to
improvements in revenue.  Compass' pricing was such that it stimulated the market and
improved load factors but there was no corresponding increase in yield.  Figure 8 illustrates a
hypothetical yield/load factor trade off.  At higher load factors, achieved through
discounting, the yield drops from Y'1 to '2.  Premium fares could fetch a yield of Y at a
lower load factor and lower fares would fetch a yield of Y'3  with a higher load factor.  The
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scope for increasing both load factors and yield on national trunk routes by a new entrant
facing competition is limited.
•
• •
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Y'2
Y'3
Y
Yield 
(Revnue per 
passenger 
mile)
Load Factor %0 % 100 %
Figure 8  Yield/Load Factor Trade-off
(c) Market Share
For the quarter ended 30 September 1991, Compass' market share measured in passengers
uplifted was 24.6% on routes which it operated (Figure 9).  Its market share nationally
measured by the number of passengers uplifted and discharged was 12.2% as at 30/09/91.
The proportions of the market share Compass gained as a direct result of stimulation of
aggregate demand or the part it obtained by passengers switching from the majors are not
publicly available.  There is no doubt though that Compass stimulated demand on the tourist
destinations such as Cairns and the longhaul routes such as Sydney/Perth.
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Figure 9. National Market Share of Compass -
December Quarter 1990 to September Quarter 1991.
Source:  Compass Annual Report for the Year Ended 30/06/91.
(d) Service
The calibre of service offered by Compass was recognised as high.  This was evidenced by
the company winning the Civil Aviation Authority's "Airways Award For Excellence", as the
best Airline amongst domestic and international airline services in the Australian market.
Despite Compass' impressive load factors, market share growth, public goodwill, service
excellence and cost efficiency, it still collapsed. The company's operating results show the
"punishment" suffered by it for the few months delay in reaching a four aircraft fleet due to
late delivery of two new aircraft from Airbus Industries to Monarch Airlines.  The company
had to lease, at unfavourable rates, an Airbus from Air Niugini over the Easter period and it
had difficulties in accessing terminal space when Australian failed to provide facilities of “a
type normally utilised by themselves” at Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney
(Compass Annual Report 30/06/91).  This impeded start-up and imposed revenue
restrictions.
Other factors impacting on the result were the economic recession in Australia which meant
bearish demand for discretionary/leisure travel.  The Gulf War affected tourism and increased
fuel prices. There is no doubt that deep discounting stimulated passenger demand.  The
average real fares fell by 10% between September 1990 and June 1991.  Figure 10 shows
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domestic airline revenue passenger kilometres since deregulation. Figure 11 shows the
increase in passenger numbers for each airline.
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Figure 10. Domestic Airline Revenue Passenger Kilometres Since Deregulation
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Figure 11.  Patronage on Domestic Airlines since Deregulation
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5. WHAT WENT WRONG?                                
When on 2 April 1991, C. Bryan Grey in a typically confident and brave-faced style
proclaimed:
"We've come through a lot of difficulties and they have been resolved
successfully.  As of today, we've no more excuses for any problems we
might face in the future";
(The Australian, 11-12 January, 1992)
the shareholders’ fears were allayed even though Compass had lost $2.7 million since startup.
A few months before Compass collapsed, its Chief Executive remained optimistic in saying:
"There has never, ever been any doubt we'll survive."
(The Australian, 11-12 January, 1992)
The collapse of Compass came as a surprise to many especially since its deep seated
problems had not been made public until this stage and, in the ensuing debate, widely
divergent explanations of the Compass' collapse emerged. The Provisional Liquidator's view
was that Compass failed to appreciate the likely cost of start-up, the likely lack of
coordination  of resources and facilities for a new business, and the response of its
competitors, concluding that:
"Each of these events depleted the available cash resources so Compass was
forced to become radical in its approach, thereby exacerbating the strain on
profitability and ultimately its cash resources";
(Ferrier, 1992, p.6).
To what extent was Compass responsible for its own downfall? The Compass management
has laid the blame squarely on the government and the lack of terminal facilities for its
malaise.  However, a number of analysts have attributed lack of success to the Compass
management itself. Considering all of the arguments, the collapse of Compass has been
attributed to one or other combination of the following:
• the relatively (high) barriers to entry which increased start-up costs
• the lack of reasonable terminal access
• competitors' responses
• Compass' competitive strategy (in particular its pricing)
• the actions of the Compass management itself
• "Force maujeure  events."
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(i) Barriers to Entry - Their Cost
It is not enough to claim that barriers to entry contributed to Compass' demise.  Compass
had entered the market and competed.  High barriers to entry can deplete the resources of a
new entrant and it is therefore important to assess the height of entry barriers for Compass,
but it is also necessary to consider on-going operational barriers.  In the case of Compass, it
appears that  the latter were more critical.
One approach to defining entry barriers is to estimate any costs faced by new entrants.
However, a more satisfactory definition is to include only those costs faced by new entrants
to the market which are not faced by incumbents, allowing them a "pricing umbrella"  and
"supernormal profits"  (Hensher, 1991a).
(a) Economic Barriers
Economic barriers (natural barriers) are those intrinsic to the technology at hand.  In the
airline industry, they would relate to equipment and capital requirements.  The primary
barrier is the existence of scale or scope economies.  In Compass' case, it was able to reap
benefits of (large) aircraft size but then faced the downside of such large equipment in a
reduced ability to offer a frequent service.  Compass was also not at a disadvantage in
respect of density economies because it freely chose to enter only the densest routes.
(b) Capital Requirements
Capital requirements can be a major barrier to entry in some industries but, in the airline
industry, equipment can be leased in a mature market for second-hand aircraft, thus
precluding large initial outlays.  Perhaps the most important aspect of capital for a new
entrant is working capital - what experts have called the "fighting fund.  It would appear
that this was a major factor in Compass' downfall.  It was under capitalised and fought a
losing battle against the majors who had greater resources.
Experts in the aviation industry posit that a new domestic airline of Compass' size needs at
least $120 million clear of leasing and other commitments to underwrite its first year of
operations (AFR 17/01/92).  Bryan Grey's original estimate was $100 million which he cut
back to $85 million after a capital raising proposal to investors through ANZ McCaughan
failed.  He finally went to Potter Warburg who agreed to underwrite a public float of $50
million which, in the event, was rushed and was over-subscribed.  Compass eventually
obtained a $15 million premium, but this proved to be insufficient.
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The risky nature of domestic aviation deters investors;  the industry's betas are quite volatile
and returns have not been flattering in many countries that underwent deregulation such as
the USA.  A number of financial experts were sceptical of Compass' ability to raise the
requisite finance from the public.  Roger Sharp of Ord Minnet for example, felt that there
was a serious shortage of capital in Australia in 1990 and Compass would not be able to raise
the "required" capital without discounting the share price (Sharp 1990).  Institutional
investors were also reluctant to invest in the new venture when first approached for
placement.  Most of the scepticism stemmed from the economic uncertainty caused by the
pilots dispute, infrastructure constraints and problems, uncertainty about deregulation, the
possibility of a single aviation market under CER, and fluctuations in oil prices.
It is notable that 40% of investment analysts downgraded their airline profit forecasts at the
end of March 1990, a repetition of concerns over the oil price and the perceptions of an
economic slow down.  Ord Minnet had been successful in floating NZ $168 million shares in
Air New Zealand in 1989, but in the Compass case it was noted that:
"The proposed start-up does not face a favourable capital raising
environment.  They should be very cautious about listing on the
Stock Exchange until their cashflows are positive and running
smoothly." 
(Sharp, 1990)
At the time Compass entered the industry, there were few willing investors and it thus revised
its requirements sharply downwards.  It must be said that this action increased the risk
associated with the start-up venture and experience now shows that this under-capitalisation
made Compass always desperate for cash and led it to take actions which a more liquid
ventures would not have needed to contemplate.
(c) Firm Created Barriers to Entry - Their Cost to Compass
As noted previously, the majors repositioned themselves and raised the barriers to entry for
incumbents with strategies of vertical and horizontal integration.  The majors bought a
number of travel agencies and firms providing complementary products, and they both joined
the Galileo CRS, formed strategic alliances with car hire firms, hotels and other travel related
suppliers.  Perhaps the most costly barrier as far as Compass was concerned was that of the
terminal leases the incumbents negotiated with the Federal Government.  Since Compass has
blamed the lack of proper terminal access for its downfall, this matter will be considered in
greater detail below.
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Frequent flyer programmes were used by large incumbent airlines after deregulation in the
USA to fight the competition from new entrants lacking extensive networks and
administrative resources to offer such benefits to loyal customers.  The frequent flyer
programmes can therefore act as a barrier to entry and operation and it is notable that
Australian and Ansett introduced frequent flyer programmes into Australia after deregulation.
Compass responded by offering two free tickets with every Compass Class purchase to the
same destination, a costly alternative to the airline.  Product differentiation relating to
brand identification, customer loyalty and goodwill becomes a barrier when an entrant has to
commit expenditure to dismantle the loyalty achieved by incumbents.  In Compass' case,
this expenditure included image building advertising, special introductory travel packages and
heavy discounting on some new routes such as Sydney-Perth.  Although these might be
regarded as the normal costs of doing business, they depleted Compass'  meagre cash
resources.  In sum, there appear to have been some barriers to entry in the deregulated
domestic aviation industry, but they were not insurmountable excepting the issue of the
terminal access.
(ii) Compass' Competitive Strategy and Competitor Reaction
(a) Cost Leadership Strategy
In an interview on the eve of deregulation, the Chairman of Compass revealed a "cost
leadership" strategy (see Porter 1980).  Bryan Grey is quoted as saying:
"We are proposing that our Melbourne-Perth, Sydney-Perth and
Melbourne-Cairns fares will be a basic 50% of the Ansett/Australian
fare.  Thus all our daylight services fares are 80% of the
[incumbents] economy fares and our curfew fares will be 50% of the
Ansett and Australian economy fares",
(Grey, 1990a, p.22).
This was a strategy to undercut the majors on three major segments on a time of the day
basis.  He went further to justify the choice of the cost leadership strategy:
"Our breakeven load factor is much lower than theirs and we
therefore can discount down below their levels and still be
profitable."
(Grey, 1990a, p.22).
Brian Grey made a gr nd and perhaps disastrous assumption when he said:
"But I believe that you have to look at it from a pragmatic point of
view - they are not going to want to make losses any more than we
would want to."
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(Grey, 1990a, p.22).
The choice of the cost leadership strategy was a reasonable one by many standards, given
Bryan Grey's observation in May 1990 that:
"Had the domestic operators controlled costs more efficiently over the
past 45 years and if their level of airfares were not at a point which
discouraged people from flying, there would be no room for start-
ups."
(Grey, 1990, p.22).
The high operating costs of the majors were the main motivation for Compass' entry.  Kirby
(1987) examined the cost structures of the majors.  He asserted that the two airlines, under
no pressure from outside competition, had established a "quiet life" duopoly.  The industry
degenerated into one lacking in innovation, market development, and offering consumers
little choice of services and prices reflecting bloated costs.  Kirby used an econometric model
of airline total operating costs which took into account the multiproduct nature of airline
services and found that Australian's operating costs were 5% higher than that of Ansett and
Australian's costs were 55% higher than its US counterparts.  Kirby attributed this to an
inadequate fleet selection policy, overstaffing and the ability of the airline to pass on
inefficiency costs to the consumer. There was therefore room for new entrants to compete on
price.  But the assumption that Compass made was that the incumbents were not capable of
cutting costs to "reasonable" levels.
In terms of a generic competitive strategy, Compass had a strong profit incentive to pursue
the cost leadership strategy.  An airline's cost position is determined by such policy issues as
aircraft type, fleet size and configuration route selection, frequency of service, stage length of
passenger haul, sales and promotion activity, wage levels, quality of meals, which airports are
used, the level of amenities at the terminals, baggage allowance offered etc.  A "no frills"
airline can reduce costs by opting for no meals or charging for in-flight services, no free
baggage allowance using spartan terminals and onboard ticketing.  Two types of passengers
can be targeted, business or non-business, and the emphasis on these sub-markets can have a
significant bearing on costs.  Bryan Grey did not want Compass to carry the tag of a "no
frills" airline.  In a news release dated 19 December 1990 he stated:
"In our view, the overall standard of service and passenger comfort is
better than Ansett or Australian Business Class",
(Sydney Morning Herald, 19 December 1990).
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Such a statement would suggest that although Compass' strategy was originally to be that of
cost leadership, it lost focus and thus became what Porter (1980) described as "stuck-in-the-
middle".
An inevitable consequence of the cost leadership strategy is price competition.  All the
efforts to reduce costs such as care in fleet selection, staffing policies,  route selection, and
well planned frequencies and schedules, should give the firm a competitive advantage.
Lower costs mean that the firm can afford to undercut its competition on fares, but this may
be only sustainable in the short run.  The majors were given the benefit of three years before
Compass' entry to rationalise their operations. Even so, Compass costs were lower than that
of the majors and it was a cost leader.  However, this leaders ip needs to be transformed
into profits through sensible pricing policies.  Compass' discounting proved to be too
deep and in the end its advantage was dissipated.  Ted Harris, the Australian Airlines
Chairman commented:
"The reason for the collapse was that Compass sold its airline tickets
at prices so heavily discounted that the company ceased to be able to
meet its financial obligations.  What we had was a Myer Sale which
should have lasted one week [but] lasted 12 months."
(Sydney Morning Herald, 5/01/92).
It would appear that Compass' choice of the cost leadership strategy was well thought-out in
its operational decisions evidenced by its fleet selection, scheduling crew rostering etc.  But
the advantages gained from its low cost operation were dissipated through "imprudent
pricing".
(b) Pricing Strategies
Compass' basic pricing strategy was to undercut the majors achieved through discounting.
What went wrong with its pricing was the level of discounts and, in some cases, their timing.
Discounted fares were initially intended to fill up Compass' planes, but when the company
achieved load factors that were well above its target of 60% it continued to initiate discount,
leading to a suspicion that some discounts were necessitated by the company's dire need for
cash.
A longitudinal analysis of the discount war (see Appendix A) shows that Compass initiated a
number of the discounts, and where it had not, it responded with even deeper discounts
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compared to what the majors had put up.  Signs of Compass ' desperate need for cash were
reflected in its pricing policies especially after August.  Stockbroker ANZ McCaughan's Mr
Dyson in an October 1991 report in the airline industry stated:
"The objective of Compass' bulk ticket sales campaign appears to be
to bolster cashflow in the short-term, which would seem to indicate a
tight funding position on an under-capitalised balance sheet."
(Sydney Morning Herald, 7/01/92).
This was more akin to a market harvesting strategy especially evident in the way Compass
cannibalised its business traveller market by offering very deep discounts to bring in cash in
the short term. Mr Grey personally admitted that Compass could breakeven on an $85
Melbourne-Sydney one-way fare only if it achieved 80% - 90% load factors, yet Compass
cut the fare to $100 return.
A comparison of Compass' pricing strategies and that of the majors reveals that while the
majors matched Compass fares at the low end of the market, they did not discount to all their
customers; their discounting was selective.  The graph below illustrates that Compass' yield
deteriorated rapidly from February onwards, yet Australian's yield was on a slow downward
trend because of the depth of the discounts in mid-year.
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Figure 12. Yield Index (December 1990 = 100)
(c) Yield Management
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Questions have been raised as to whether Compass subscribed to the idea of and actually
practiced yield management techniques, the objective of which is to maximise profits for a
given flight rather than to maximise cashflow  (Kraft et al, 1984).  The fact that almost every
major North American airline adopted some system of managing seats, indicates that yield
management is crucial to profitability (Kraft et al, 1984). Yield management predicts, using
the likely load and fare mix of each flight, the flight profitability and ensures the right ratio of
differently priced seats are offered to the market.  The concept rests on four characteristics
of airline markets: perishability of the product (seats), the ability to price discriminate, the
joint production of seats in various fare classes, and the predictability of demand.
The majors have developed their use of yield management programmes, and  Compass,
before it commenced operations, claimed that it would adopt the technique.  With much of
the travel agency industry linked to CRS's the majors had a head start in applying information
technology and they used their position to lock-in their direct corporate business and
controlled agencies and the distribution of fare types. In retrospect, it would appear that
there was no serious commitment in Compass to practice yield management;  this was
revealed in a speech to the Australian Transport Research Forum in Hobart in 1991, Mr
Bryan Grey said:
"We don't believe in sophisticated systems such as yield
management, we keep things simple and operate on a day to day
basis."
      (Grey, 1991).
It would therefore appear that even if there were "grand" plans for a yield management
system, it was cast aside as Compass grappled with the more immediate problems of
technical insolvency.  The very fact that Compass discounted so deeply to business
passengers, offering them undated, unlimited coupon tickets, is a pointer to the lack of a
proper use of yield management techniques.  Compass was discounting to the very premium
fare passengers it strove so hard to attract.  Besides, Compass' discounts often overlapped
and, where it reacted to discounts initiated by the majors, its own discounts apparently
disregarded what it might have earlier planned - a pointer to the lack of proper yield
management practices. Despite Compass' protestations to the contrary, it has turned out that
Compass did not have an on-line yield management system in place in its crucial start-up
phase and it appears that such a system was to be acquired in 1992.
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(d) Market Positioning, Segmentation and Targeting
A Compass brochure to business travellers stated:
"The Compass philosophy is to offer unconditionally lower fares on
every seat, every flight, every time."
(Save Money on Your Business Travel).
This philosophy might be taken to be a commentary on Compass' marketing philosophy.
What was not clear though was whether Compass wanted to be a "no-frills" airline or to be
on the top end of the market.  Its action (i.e. pricing) was more akin to the former, but its
statements were aimed at pitching the company at the top end of the market.  There was no
clarity as to what Compass wanted to be in - the business traveller's perceptual map and the
non-business travellers' mind. It is as though it wanted to be everything to everyone - "stuck-
in-the-middle"  (Porter, 1980).
Compass had 8.9% of the business travel market in the last quarter of 1991 (BTCE, 1991)
but this share had been lured by heavy discounts and was not a high yield market.  Compass
seriously considered how it might increase its average yield from the business travellers late
into its operations, belatedly introducing a business class section on its aircraft in December
of 1991.  From its inception, Compass embraced the strategy of being a single class carrier
despite the failure of similar single class carriers in the USA such as People's Express.
Market research can also be valuable in positioning the firm and in targeting major segments
to match the company's offers, yet Bryan Grey, in an interview  in October 1990 said:
"I don't believe in market research, as much as other people do.  I
think it is important, but don't believe it until it is achieved."
(Grey, 1990a, p23).
Compass commenced a major business venture without in-depth research into its market,
designed its service in the absence of specific information about consumer wants and
embarked on deep discounting without any evidence regarding the impacts of low fares.  The
lack of proper targeting is also evidenced by Compass' failure to bid for freight early into its
operations.  It began to capitalise on the unique ability of its Airbus fleet to carry big
consignments of outsize freight late in the year.  When the airline collapsed, it had uplifted
about 1000 tonnes of freight for carriers such as Qantas, Continental, United and Northwest,
but this represented only 20% of its capacity (Australian Financial Review, 2/01/92).
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(iii) Competitors’ Response
A costly assumption that Compass made was that the majors would not respond to its
discounts in the way they did and consequently underestimated the degree of the ensuing
price war.  When the majors responded by discounting to the same level of fares as Compass,
Mr Grey accused them of predation, and after its collapse claimed that:
"... the financial problems at Compass emanated from the predatory pricing
policies of Ansett and Australian."
(Sunday Telegraph 22/12/91).
Further, he argued that Ansett and Australia had invested
"millions and millions of dollars in the discount air fares pricing war
undercutting Compass to force it out of business"
(Sunday Telegraph 22/12/91, p.4).
Both of the major incurred losses for the year, but they were better capitalised than Compass
and were able to sustain the fares war.  The Trade Practices Commission is investigating the
issue of predation by the majors.
(iv) The Compass Management
A notable feature of most executive service contracts is the heavy amount of responsibility
they bear for the performance of the company and ultimately, responsibility lies with the
company's directors/executives.  Bryan Grey gave the impression of being a hands-on
manager and it is worthwhile to examine to what degree he and his executives were
responsible for the collapse of the company.
(a) A Risk Prone Management - "Reckless" Discounting?
The Compass management took  risky decisions on a number of occasions exemplified in
their price discounting strategies and the ultimate admission by Mr Grey that:
"I didn't believe that they were willing to lock us into those prices and to
lose hundreds of millions of dollars themselves to hold our head under water
at those prices."
(Grey, 1991a).
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With his experience in the aviation industry, Mr Grey and his executives might have expected
this outcome especially given the ample evidence from the US experience of deregulation
that the big airlines were prepared to fight it out for market share and to make heavy
investment in the hub-and-spoke systems to consolidate their market shares. In the context,
the forecasts that Compass made of profitability have proven to be too optimistic.  The
accounting concept of conservatism seems to have been disregarded by the Compass
management in making its forecasts.  Indeed, its Chief Executive in his capacity of manager
of Air Niugini was accused by the PNG's Omsbudsman Report of a similar shortcomings in
saying that:
"Based upon a flimsy foundation of unsupported assumptions and over-
eager optimism, the expansion of routes and the acquisition of additional
aircraft was both ill-conceived and ill-timed."
(Sunday Telegraph 22/12/91, p.4).
Timing was important in Compass' case.  When it entered the industry, not all the ground
work had been done and negotiations were still going on for terminal access with Australian.
Despite this, Compass decided to take forward bookings for commencing services in
December as early as October 1990, prompting one of Compass' former executives to
comment that they were operating as though a gun was held to their heads.  Knowing that
there were no prospects in the then near future of new entrants (most were still negotiating
for their Air Services Certificates), the Compass management could have delayed take-off
until all negotiations for terminal access were finalised.  The company was required to pay
Australian a security deposit at short notice for using the terminals before negotiations were
finalised, a drain on its meagre cash resources.
The company was under-capitalised from day one, and, proceeding with substantially less
than the $100 million first believed necessary, Compass increased its risk.  A Porter Marburg
former partner is quoted as having said that the float was "fairly rushed" and that Mr Grey is
an impetuous person (Business Review Weekly, 17/01/92).  Knowing of its poor
capitalisation and subsequent lack of cash, management should have moved early enough to
correct the under-capitalisation problem, possibly by raising new equity.  Instead, it gambled
on "borrowing from passengers" as much of its discounting appears to have been motivated
by the need for cash rather than market share build-up.  In May for example, (Recession
Buster) Compass decided to forward-sell heavily discounted seats to bolster liquidity.  Alex
Klujin, a former Compass vice-president of marketing was aware of good practice, but this
was not implemented:
"Its your mixture of fares that is important to profitability not your low-
yield promotional fares or your high-yield business fares",
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(Business Review Weekly 17/01/92, p.17).
By offering open-dated bulk tickets or freedom fares to corporate customers in June 1991
Compass was effectively discounting to the market that it hoped would provide its most
important profits.  For instance the Sydney-Melbourne one-way ticket was sold to business
travellers at $95 and Compass only secured corporate business on the Sydney-Melbourne
route at a more attractive rate of $165 (one way) in the last weeks of the airline - too late!
The company's discounted fares tended to overlap as one type of discount offer would come
in whilst the other was still active.  It became clear that Compass would still have operated at
losses well into 1992 and financial analysts commented that it was no surprise that the
company collapsed around Christmas time (see The Business Review Weekly, January
1992).  In the previous months, a substantial amount of flight capacity had been sold to
passengers at heavily discounted fares and few passengers booked for 1992.  After the peak
selling period just before Christmas, there were not sufficient buyers to sustain the cashflow.
(b) Financial/Cash Management
Compass' liquidity problems existed from the beginning.  Liquidity ratios either in the form of
quick acid ratios or current asset to liabilities ratios may help to illustrate the point being
made (Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Ratio of Current Assets to Liabilities on a Monthly Basis
Pre-sold tickets increased as from May and Compass became more exposed as far as this
aspect of unsecured creditors risk was concerned. It is significant that despite making a
"profit" in June, this was the month when its liquidity ratios were at their worst.  As from
June onwards, Compass experienced problems in meeting its payments to Qantas, CAA,
FAC and the aircraft lessors, and was slow in reimbursing passengers. The Provisional
Liquidators proposal to get Compass back on the air without its current management
reflected a lack of faith in the management of Compass.
(v) "Force Maujeure Events"
There were events that were beyond the control of the Compass management which
contributed to its problems and subsequent collapse. The late delivery of its third and fourth
aircraft was one such event. Compass' third and fourth aircraft were planned for delivery and
commencement of service in February and March 1991, respectively.  The third aircraft was
delayed due to industrial action at the manufacturer Airbus Industrie, finally delivered in July
1991.
The fourth aircraft was significantly delayed due to an accident at the manufacturers facilities,
requiring major repairs.  The aircraft was eventually accepted for delivery in late August
1991 and commenced operations in the last week of August.  The combined aircraft delays
reduced Compass' available capacity by approximately 26% from that planned to the 30th of
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June (Jeffrey, 1992). To cover for the delay in the third aircraft over the Easter period, for
which significant bookings had been taken, Compass took a short term lease of an Airbus
A310 aircraft from Air Niugini at a significant penalty compared to long term arrangements.
As part of a settlement arising from the delay, Airbus made available spare parts worth about
$20 million but denied liability.  Some of this $20 million involved credit for parts for which
Compass had already received or were on order and this worsened the cashflow position.
Due to this continuing delay of the fourth aircraft, Compass introduced an additional aircraft,
an Airbus A310-300, on lease from Canadian Airlines and commencing services on the 1st of
July to be retained on a three year operating lease. All these delays had a significant impact
on scheduling, load factor, and hence yield.  They also reduced schedule flexibility and
frequency attributes that are valued by the business traveller.
Compass came into the market at a time when demand for leased aircraft was bullish.  The
operating leases it struck with Polaris and Monarch Airlines were at punitive rates; 1990 was
the peak of an ordering binge.  But after 1990, lessors managed to place only 22% of the 850
aircraft they had committed to buy.  For instance Triple A, another potential entrant,  claims
that its aircraft cost one tenth of the $800,000 a month Compass paid for its two A300s (Age
15/09/92).
Technical problems associated with aircraft maintenance requirements forced Compass to
buy a General Electric engine, thus tying a sizeable amount of the airlines start-up capital in
aircraft spares. The Gulf War affected fuel prices and thus added unbudgetted fuel costs at
the same time that demand for discretionary and tourist travel was depressed. Some analysts
would argue that all airlines were affected the same way by the recession and the fuel price
hikes, but these twin effects would have been much more poignant for Compass given the
cash-strapped nature of its operations.
Compass drastically underestimated the need for an adequate reservations system.  There
was an inability to answer all calls promptly with a subsequent loss of customers, leading
Barry Cooney (vice president of customer services) to comment that:
"The net effect is that it destroyed our credibility in answering telephone
calls."
      (Business Review Weekly, 17/01/92).
It took Compass until September 1991 to set up a telephone reservation system that was at
best satisfactory.
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(vi) Predatory Pricing
Soon after the collapse of the Company, Bryan Grey accused the majors of predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing is the practice of charging a very low price for a product/service with the
intent of driving a competitor out of business, with a subsequent raising of prices after the
entrant has failed to survive.  Predatory pricing is illegal under the Trade Practices Act, but
proving its presence has always been difficult and expensive because it must be shown that
the predator explicitly attempted to destroy a competitor and the predatory price was below
the defendant's average cost.
The Trade Practices Commission is investigating Compass' claims of predation.  It is a
daunting task complicated by the following issues:
• Compass' assertions do not relate to any particular airline.  They have been
blandly heaped on both Ansett and Australian.  This presupposes collusion
between Ansett and Australian in fare setting  - an argument that is difficult to
sustain given evidence of competition between the two.
• Average costs, and therefore the base price, in the airline industry are hard to
arrive at.  As one unnamed sceptic commented:
"Airline accounts can read almost anything the airline wants them to read."
(Sydney Morning Herald, 12/05/90)
• Compass initiated a number of fare discounts with some fares set below
breakeven point.  Bryan Grey admitted that Compass had to charge at least $85
one-way on the Sydney-Melbourne route in order to break-even on a load factor
of 80-90%.  Yet in November 1991 Compass set the fare at $100 return - well
below the break-even point and at a lower than 80% load factor.  The question
then arises of who was the predator?
• After Compass ceased operations, the majors still continued (albeit in the short
term) to offer deep discounts, making it harder to legally prove the charge of
predation.
Whatever conclusions are reached after ex post investigation and rationalisation by the TPC
and interested commentators on whether there was predatory pricing or not, there will
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always be a cloud of doubt as to whether the said practice was responsible for Compass'
demise. The Chairman of Australian Airlines reacted to Compass' charges:
"False allegations of predatory pricing policies and of conspiracy which
have been made by Compass can only be assumed to be an attempt to
obscure and distort the reasons for the Compass collapse."
  (Australian Tourism Development Magazine, 1992, p.15).
(vii) Terminal Facilities
The most controversial issue as far as the Compass collapse is concerned is that of terminal
facilities.  Bryan Grey has claimed that 90-95% of the company's collapse was due to lack of
proper access.  There is some truth in the view that terminal access affected Compass'
operations adversely, but the BTCE (1991a) asserts that since Compass was able to
compete, terminal access was not an absolute barrier to entry. We now  examine the issue in
more detail.
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6. A MAJOR ISSUE - TERMINAL FACILITIES!
                                                           
Denial of access serves as an absolute barrier to entry.  If access is given but restricted and
not of the standard required to run an airline efficiently, then this is a barrier to operations.
The "grandfather rights" to terminal facilities and development land around them in the form
of 20 year leases and eight year leases (for land) were negotiated by the Federal Government
and the incumbents on the eve of the formation of the Federal Airport Corporation.  Mr Grey
has described them as "scandalous" and the FAC and the TPC have taken issue with the way
terminal access has been handled, including the way the terminal leases were concluded.
In 1990, 23 million passengers passed through the top ten airports representing 90% of all
passenger movements in Australia. Table 5 shows the Domestic Passenger Movements at
Major Airports.  Over 63% of all passengers passed through Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane
and Compass was operating on those routes (BTCE, 1991a).  Any restriction or access to
terminals at these airports raises serious questions about competition policy.
Table 5. Domestic Passenger Movements at Major Airpots
Airport Passenger Movements Percentage of
(000s) all Movements
Sydney 6 690 27.0
Melbourne 5 904 22.8
Brisbane 3 486 13.4
Adelaide 1 864   7.2
Perth 1 399   5.4
Canberra    949   3.7
Coolangatta    892   3.4
Cairns    703   2.7
Hobart    535   2.1
Alice Springs                                   447                                                1.7
Top Ten Airports   23 171 89.4
Total Australia  25 930 100.0
Source:  BTCE (1991a) from DOTC (1990).
In December 1987 just before the handover of airport management to the FAC the Federal
Government renegotiated the lease arrangements with Australian and Ansett for terminal
facilities at Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide, Launceston and Coolangatta airports. The
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new lease conditions for Sydney airport not only cover the existing terminals, but also
expansion land.  The arrangements gave the incumbents leases with options for around 28
years for all terminal space and land for terminal development. The FAC would provide
accommodation at Brisbane and Hobart, whilst the leases required Australian and Ansett to
provide gates at their terminals as follows:
Sydney 2 each
Melbourne 2 each
Adelaide 1 each
Perth 1 each
Coolangatta 1 by Ansett only
(i) Compass' Problems with the Leases
From the time the leases were signed, Mr Grey constantly criticised them.  He claimed that
the turnaround of an aircraft particularly a domestic jet aircraft requires approximately 45
minutes requiring the minimum time available at a stop of one hour to allow for pushouts.
With aircraft movements limited at the curfew ports to approximately 7am to 7pm, it follows
that only twelve positions are available at each slot, which means a limitation of 24
movements for Compass at both Sydney and Melbourne, the two busiest ports.  But even
this was subject to traffic capacity and flight scheduling (which tends to be clustered) thus
further limiting access.  Grey Claimed:
"For such a time that common user terminals are not available it is
impossible to operate eight or twelve units as other start-ups projected."  
   (Grey, 1990)
Given these restrictions, Grey argued that the sensible operational decision was to select high
capacity aircraft to maximise throughput at the terminals, a strategy enhanced by the lower
operating cost (on a per seat-kilometre basis) of these aircrafts.  Interestingly, Compass first
sought Boeing 767's and wanted Qantas to maintain the planes, but when the proposed deal
fell through, the preference for B-767's declined.
(ii) Rents and the Conduct of the Sub-Lessor (Australian)
Compass approached Australian for sub-leases at Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth.  It
is reported that Australian was co-operative in negotiations before Compass started its
flights, but all this changed as Mr Grey had anticipated:
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"I don't want to overstate the degree of co-operation from Australian.  At
the moment everyone is being very nice.  It's the velvet glove.  But in a
minute, that attitude could change."
(BWR, 17/01/92)
Compass and Australian are presently in court over the rent charged and the quality of access
afforded Compass.  Compass claimed that Australian overcharged it on rentals at Melbourne
and Sydney airports.  This dispute was settled by arbitration.  Compass was awarded $4.9
million, although this has been challenged by Australian Airlines, and taken to the high court.
(a) Melbourne Airport
Compass' complaints with its access at the Melbourne terminal were that its passengers were
provided with inadequate information (lack of signs), that they faced long walking distances
to the most remote gates and that baggage handling arrangements were inefficient.  The last-
mentioned factor was claimed to add to costs and difficulties manifested themselves in lost
baggage and delays.  In total, compass claimed that it had lost between $20-30 million
because of inadequate access to this terminal.  When taken to arbitration, a decision was
handed down for Australian Airlines to compensate Compass for damages of $4 million,
although this is subject to appeals.
Compass' claims will be dealt with in the courts, but research evidence to support its
arguments are weak.  Several recent studies (see Lemer 1992, Seneviratne and Martel 1991)
have found that passengers do rate information, walking distance and baggage handling
highly in their assessment of terminal performance.  However, the issue is complicated
because frequent flyers tend to arrive late for their flights with a desire to be seated in a
departure lounge as quickly as possible.  Leisure travellers arrive early and tend to seek
provision of service inside the terminal.  Thus, attitudes about terminal performance depend
very much on the mix of traffic being served.  More importantly, it is necessary to ask the
question whether the traveller's perception of the terminal reflects itself within the traveller's
preference for a particular carrier.  Few published studies of carrier choice exist, but there is
some limited evidence that passengers rate terminal performance low relative to other
determinants of carrier choice (see Etherington and Van 1984).  It is more likely that
terminal performance would be limited to an airline where that airline appears to be in total
control of the terminal, but airlines are more likely to want to minimise their terminal costs
when such an association is weak (Lemer 1992).
(b) Perth Airport
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At Perth airport, Australian had wanted Compass to alter its timetable to accommodate
passengers in its terminal area.  Unwilling to upset its aircraft schedule, Compass chose
instead to use the international terminal.  This was disadvantageous because domestic and
international terminals at Perth are one kilometre apart.
(c) Sydney Airport
At Sydney Airport Compass passengers had to carry baggage upstairs to check-in counters
whereas the Australian ground level check-in counters were 20 metres from the street.  The
direction of the lone escalator near the Compass check-in counter was determined by
whether most passengers were arriving at the terminal or departing.  Passengers had to walk
through a narrow passage into the holding lounge and, when two Compass aircraft were
boarding simultaneously, only about half the passengers could be seated in the lounge.
Business travellers disliked collecting their baggage at a regional airlines terminal.
(d) Adelaide Airport - the Tin Sheds and Pin-Stripes
At Adelaide Airport, when Compass commenced services in July 1991, negotiations with
Australian for terminals were not complete.  Compass had to use a tin shed as a make-shift
gate, leading Compass to complain that it could not attract "pin-stripe traffic". There is no
doubt that the terminal leases gave the incumbents a lot of market power, a direct parallel to
experiences in the USA after deregulation.
In 1986, the US government greatly increased the competitive strength of incumbent carriers
by giving to the carriers at no cost, their existing landing and takeoff slots to be traded as
their own property.  The value of landing and take-off slots to an airline can be gauged by
Pan Am's purchase in 1986 of three gates at both Boston and New York and 64 landing
slots in New York and Washington for $65 million (Button, 1989). As to what value and
therefore how far Compass was disadvantaged will be determined by the courts as Compass
and Australian are still involved in litigation and the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) has
mooted the idea of the TPC taking up Compass' case.  This brings us to the roles of the TPC,
the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA) and the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC).
(iii) The Federal Airports Corporation
The Federal Airports Corporation's role and responsibilities are to provide, operate and
maintain terminals, runway, taxiways and aprons, co-ordinate planning and development,
provide services and facilities, and provide consultancy and management service. The signing
of the terminal lease agreements with the incumbents just before the inception of the FAC on
                                                                                                            
                                                                                                            
                                                 6. A MAJOR ISSUE - T
 Institute of Transport Studies   51
1 January 1988 meant that the FAC's hands were tied.  It has publicly criticised the
agreements.
The FAC has endeavoured to provide terminal access for Compass at Brisbane and Cairns.
It has also undertaken to help the intending new entrant, AAA, to set up its own gates and
terminals, before it was known that AAA was just a "paper" company.  There might be a
case for the FAC to be given much more power to oversee how the majors extend sub-leases
to new entrants.
(iv) The Trade Practices Commission
The TPC undertook in 1990 to:
"watch closely the process of negotiation that occurs in respect of levels of
access and the provision of necessary facilities to new entrants."  
    (Merlini, 1990, p.5)
The TPC's main role is that of an industry watchdog.  Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act
empowers it to take action against abuse of market power.  To date it is investigating
Compass' allegations of predatory pricing by the majors. Perhaps its most important role
would be to ensure that all intending new entrants get a fairer deal in terms of terminal access
and fair competition generally.  Although it rarely takes companies to court for litigation, its
philosophy is predicated on the assumption that the self-interest of business is staying in
business and the very large investment in goodwill that a business would have made over the
years may be seen as a guarantee that it will behave within the law.
(v) The Prices Surveillance Authority
The PSA acts as a monitor rather than a strict controller of pricing policy.  It has no direct
power to order change in a pricing structure but has tremendous power through its ability to
inform the market and make public its attitudes on pricing stability. In essence, the PSA's
guidelines provide for cost based pricing with a general requirement that costs be actually
incurred rather than simply anticipated.  Its much acclaimed power has not been
demonstrated in the aviation industry.  There could be a case for it not only to look at price
increases but also discounts that are prejudicial to the well-being of an enterprise, and  hence
its shareholders and creditors.
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7. THE FUTURE AND NEW ENTRANTS
The collapse of Compass has precipitated an inquiry by the Federal Government into the
operations and structure of the domestic aviation industry, with questions such as  "was there
ever a level playing field?"  being asked. Although, barriers to entry and operation do exist in
the form of restricted terminal access, the BTCE (1991) has argued that they are not
insurmountable, even though they do impose a cost on the new entrants. From the individual
air carrier's perspective, a lack of terminal access and ground facilities poses three serious
problems; first, delays are costly because they entail unproductive use of aircraft and flight
crew time; second, delays can impose additional indirect costs by delaying connecting flights
to which detained aircraft and crews are assigned; and third, poor ground and terminal
facilities used in passenger servicing and luggage handling can raise air carriers' operating
expenses as well as introduce delays and disruptions of schedule operations.
Unlike air transport routes, where restrictions on entry are almost entirely artificial,
constraints on access to airports usually reflect real physical limitations.  In the Australian
scene, the allocation of scarce terminal space has given the incumbents market power. A pro-
competition policy would lessen market power of the majors by easing entry conditions
through facilitating access to inputs.
The scope and effect of policy is greatest when it is directed forwards limiting the creation of
market power rather than limiting its use.  Industry watchdogs such as the TPC and PSA all
have roles to play, but their roles tend to be reactive.  Their attempts to limit market power
abuse are made much more onerous by the fact that firms that abuse market power do so in
subtle ways without really testing the law to its finite limits.
The Federal Government is well aware of the disadvantages that new entrants face because of
terminal access constraints.  It intends to spend $130 million on new airport terminal assets in
order to avoid fledgling carriers being forced to operate from Ansett or Australian Airline's
terminals (AFR, 10/02/92).  These will be common-user terminals and plans are afoot to
construct these at Sydney and Melbourne initially before going to other areas.  These
common-user terminals will be a big fillip to new entrants such as Transcontinental and
Southern Cross, both having expressed reservations about using the majors' facilities.
The entry of Compass meant that domestic aviation travel became affordable to many
Australians, an objective of the government when it introduced deregulation.  The BTCE
(1991a) undertook empirical  research into the impact of discount fares across the top 100
markets and found that the presence of Compass has been a stimulus to competition while
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Ansett and Australian were also competing more with each other than ever before. Domestic
tourism was also stimulated and became the main growth industry during the recession.
Also, increased competition forced the majors to cut costs.
The Compass collapse precipitated the government's wide review of aviation policy, both
domestic and international.  This has resulted in a "Sweeping three-pronged shakeout of
aviation policy" (AFR 27/02/92).  The main tenet of the reform programme is ultimately the
creation of a single aviation market with New Zealand under the Closer Economic Relations
(CER) umbrella. Stage one of the policy will mean the removal of equity barriers between
Australian operators with the result that the privatisation process will be enhanced by
clearing the way for Qantas to buy into Australian or Ansett and for domestic airlines to take
a stake in Qantas.
Stage two will involve opening up the trans-Tasman services to any Australian or NZ airline,
allowing domestic airlines to compete with international carriers on that route no later than
1993.  Qantas will not be allowed to operate purely domestic sectors in its own right until
multiple designation on international routes is extended to areas other than the Tasman.
Stage three involves the implementation of a single aviation market with a common border
which would allow all Australian and NZ airlines to operate within the two nations as well as
trans-Tasman.
The option of merging of the Australian, New Zealand and trans-Tasman markets was
examined by a Joint Australia-New Zealand study team consisting of the Bureau of Transport
and Communications Economics and Jarden Morgan NZ Limited.  The team found that:
• Any benefits to consumers from a relaxation of regulatory barriers to entry would
come in the form of reduced airfares and an improvement in the quality of air
services.
• Deregulation would create new opportunities for entrants, while subjecting the
incumbents to the rigours of new competition.
• The net welfare gains from a single Australasian aviation market relative to
Australian domestic aviation would be $53 million.
• If Air New Zealand were to respond to a possible Ansett competitive threat in the
Australasian market by entering the Australian market, the welfare gain would be
$141 million.
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• Welfare gains would be less if there was to be restricted cabotage.
The study concluded that, overall, there are some net welfare gains to be had from a single
aviation market under varied scenarios. Table 6 below summarises the welfare consequences
of Australian domestic aviation, and a single Australasian aviation market.
Table 6. The Welfare Consequences of Australian Deregulation 
and a Single Australasian Market
Australian Deregulation Single Market
$M $M
Consumer Gain 236 329
Change in Airline Profits -48 -88
Cost Cut Transfer                                            -71                                   -71
Net Welfare Gain 117 170
Source:  (BTCE and NZ Study Team, 1991).
In the international distribution of the welfare gains Australia will stand to gain more. The
achievement of the net benefits of a single aviation market might be constrained in the short
term by the excess demand for runway access at Sydney's Kingsford-Smith Airport.
Additional terminal capacity would be required if domestic airlines which entered the trans-
Tasman market sought to use their existing domestic terminal facilities to process
international passengers.
Questions may be asked whether Australia, with a population of 17 million can afford more
than two or three airlines.  Economies of scale, scope and density that have to be achieved
limit the size or number of players that could participate fully and gainfully.  Access Research
(1989) has estimated that the Australian domestic market could only support three trunk
route carriers.  Where does this put the intending new entrants especially after the
announcement that Qantas and Air New Zealand may compete domestically?  Analysts tend
to agree that there is no room for a third major domestic carrier and new entrants will have
to concentrate on niches.
Notably, Transcontinental plans to position itself as an affordable, premium service, aimed
squarely at the air-aware businessman.  It plans to operate from Western Australia and
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compete against Ansett WA using new aircraft.  Initially it will lease six Boeing 737's from
Peat Aviation and Braathen.  The leases have already been negotiated but the chief executive
is reported to be unhappy with terminal arrangements.  He is reportedly quoted as saying:
"We are starting from a very hostile environment."
 (Age 15/01/91).
Transcontinental intends to have one employee per seat compared to AAA's proposed one
employee per 2.5 seats and Ansett's one employee per 5 to 6 seats;  low overheads will
translate to less sensitivity to load factor fluctuations  (Age 15/01/92).  Management projects
that it will be profitable at a 50% load factor. It will eschew frequent flyer programmes.
Transcontinental plans to have a large employee share ownership programme (ESOP).  It has
an investor who will provide 70% of the $160 - $170 million capital and 30% of the shares
will be in a debt-financed workers' trust.
The collapse of Compass and the proposed single market has made it harder for new start-
ups to raise capital.  The cost of capital is a real barrier to entry.  The Corporations Act
provisions increasing director and stockbroker liability also suggest it might be a while before
the stock market thaws.  For instance, stockbrokers Porter Partners were obliged out of
prudence and in a bid to parry away any possibilities of litigation in the light of a Compass
collapse to spell out that
"Compass must be regarded as speculative."
(The Age 15/01/92).
AAA is proposing to start operating in June 1992 using DC-9-30's., originally to be leased
from Ansett and of late to be leased from a Florida (US) based company. It plans to operate
a "no-frills" shuttle service between Brisbane-Sydney-Melbourne.  However, the airline has
been recently depicted as a "paper company" and as of March 1992, did not have an Air
Operator's Licence from the CAA, has no aircraft, no terminals, and is unable to pay its staff
of 46. It has been accused of defrauding pilots, and the integrity of its managing director is
being questioned  (Sydney Morning Herald 12/02/92).
Southern Cross aka Compass now appears to be the most likely third player, operating
under the Compass banner.  The Provisional Liquidators have in principle agreed to its
proposal involving the use of Compass' goodwill. There are however real danger signs for
the market for start-ups and entrepreneurial capital in Australia.  The nature of venture
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capital projects like Southern Cross is such that the risk portfolio must be spread. Southern
Cross plans to use MD-80 aircraft and will capitalise on the price elasticity in the market as
demonstrated by Compass. The details of Southern Cross' takeover of Compass and using
the Compass logo and livery will become clearer in the near future.
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8. CONCLUSION                                         
The broader question that arises from the commercial collapse of Compass is whether there is
a case for ascribing its ill-fate to market failure (or more precisely the failure of deregulation)
on the part of Compass' management. On the available evidence, it appears that Compass
collapsed more because of its management decisions rather than the absence of a "level
playing field".  Poor capitalisation, poor risk management, poor pricing strategies, a poor
service positioning strategy, all seem to have contributed to Compass' demise more than the
much "trumpeted" limited terminal access.  There is no denying that terminal access was
unfavourable to Compass' operations, but to ascribe the failure of the company to it is
unrealistic.  Compass was able to compete and to get the load factor it had projected.  It
failed to price its services realistically.
The collapse of Compass has brought with it positive spin-offs in aviation policy formulation.
The Federal Government is now considering building common user terminals to give new
entrants a fair chance to compete.  It is also proposing to create a single aviation market that
will see Qantas, Air New Zealand, Ansett and Australian compete in the domestic aviation
market. The industry is still in a state of flux and its future is not that clear.  There are,
however, some healthy signs as far as policy formulation is concerned while the government
appears to be committed to letting market forces be the ultimate  arbitor.
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9. APPENDICES                                                                         
Appendix A                                                                                  
THE COMPASS CALENDAR -
A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AND FARE INITIATIVES
Lead-up Deregulation
Raising the Barriers to Entry and Re-positioning by incumbents
August 1984: Pilots dispute seriously affects operations of Australian and Ansette
May 1987: Senator Evans announces end of TAP by 31 October 1990.
June 1987: Compass Airlines formed.
June 1990: Compass raises $65 million through public float.
Date Carrier Particulars Routes Conditions
Early 1990 Australian
Ansett
40% discount for travellers over 60 years to end
30 October 1990
Late August 1990 Ansett
Australian
50% discounting for off-peak return travel - first
on Sydney-Melbourne corridor and subsequently
all the major cities
Sydney - Melbourne a number of stay restrictions
and booking restrictions
6 September 1990 Australian 50% discount, minimum inflight service and add-
on and back-of-the-clock flights.  One flight on
each route.
Sy ney - Melbourne
Sydney - Gold Coast
Melbourne - Gold Coast
Melbourne - Cairns
7 days advance booking
required stay 7 to 14 days
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9 September 1990 Eastwest (a
member of
the Ansett
Transport
Group
50% discount on its routes Leisure market 30 day advance purchase
3 nights minimum stay
17 September 1990 Ansett 50% discount Perth - Melbourne
Sydney - Perth
night flights from 1 October
no booking or stay
conditions
21 September 1990 Australian 53% discounts (average) Major eastern cities late night and overnight
flights
duration 1 Novermber to 16
March 1991
7 days advance booking
22 September 1990 Ansett 40% discount on Sydney - Melbourne return fare
from 1 October for afternoon and evening flights
- except Saturday afternoon
Sydney - Melbourne both legs to be booked
together
ticket purchase within 24
hours of booking
1 October 1990 Compass Opened booking for 1 December take-off.
Discounts
i) 20% off Australian and Ansett economy fare
across the board.
ii) 50% off the majors economy fares all
transcontinental  flights.
All routes See particulars
9 October 1990 Australian 1st 55% discount - response to Ansett and
Compass night transcontinental flights increased
to 55%.
See particulars
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17 October 1990 Eastwest 55% discounts on all flights booked by 31
October 1990
All routes For flight period 1/11/90 -
13/12/90
18 October 1990 Ansett 50% discount of off-peak services extended to
Canberra.
60% discount "Rockbottom" on selected flights
from 31 October to Brisbane.
Canberra
Other Eastern seaboard
cities
7 day advance purchase
no stayover provisions
1 November 1990:           TAP COMES TO AN END
December 1990 • 1st two weeks, low load factors.  Flights cancelled.
• bookings for cargo received on Perth-Melbourne-Perth route.
• introduced night flights Sydney-Perth - 15 December.
• fare set at $250 "Day Take-Off". - Perth fare
• Compass announces that it's not taking the majors' fare
increase of 7.5% occasioned by fuel hikes.
18 December 1990 Terminals
•  Bryan Grey announces that Compass has no problems with
Terminals at Brisbane and Perth.
•  Reservation problems announced - reservation resource
increased 3-fold.
•  Bryan Grey - dismisses the "No Frills" tag and restates
commitment "to being highly sensitive to demand patterns and
having the flexibility and initiative to increase routes that
people want to fly and give them prices they can afford".
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ENTER COMPASS
December 1990:    Compass begins operations with 2 airbuses, serving major cities on Eastern seaboard.
January 1991 Clearance Sale
January 1991 Compass simply matches the majors' discounts
1 January 1991 Ansett 61% discounts on > 150 routes between
15/01/91 and 3/02/91.
Sale period 2 - 14 January
2500 seats available daily
all major routes one night stay
payment within 24 hours of
booking and no refunds
1 January 1991 Australian matched Ansett and extended travel period to
14/02/91
2 January 1991 Ansett
Express
same discounts as Australian
3 January 1991 Compass 61% discount in advance
24 hours in advance standby
booking fare discount of up to 61% available
7/01/91
all routes it serves see particulars
3 January 1991 Eastwest 50 - 60% discounts available immediately until
February
February 1991 .  marked improvement in yield - at its highest.
.  3rd aircraft arrival delayed.
.  no major fare initiatives.
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March 1991 .  no major fare initiatives.
.  Compass hires Air Niugini Airbus to accomodate pre-booked
Easter traffic.  Punishing lease payments.
April 1991 .  4th aircraft delayed.
.  Compass announces loss of $1.8 million for the half year
ended 31/12/90.
.  Bryan Grey announces on 2 April that Compass' problems
are over and no more excuses were to be made should there
be any problems.
THE 'MAY' RECESSION BUSTERS
May 1991 .  the beginning of a major discount war.
.  delays in aircraft delivery take their toll on yields.
3 May 1991 Compass 70% discounts on fares purchased by 31 May for
20 seats on all flights for the n xt twelve
months e.g. Sydney-Melbourne $85 one way.
all routes fares transferable but not
refundable
9 May 1991 Ansett
Australian
responded but no limits to seats all routes see particulars
10 May 1991 Compass lifted the seat limit from twenty to fifty seats
23 May 1991 Compass more discounted seats - on sale to 30 June at
$110 Sydney - Melbourne
29 May 1991 Ansett announced a same day spot sale of Sydney -
Perth and Melbourne - Perth tickets for $100 one-
way for 100 seats on each flight
see particulars
12 hours notice
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN - WAR OF ATTRITION
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June 1991 .  sees the beginning of "suicidal" discounting war.
.  end of Compass' first financial year in operation.
   Compass incurs a loss of $16.6 million.
.  delivery of third aricraft and plans to commence
  operations to Adelaide
21 June 1991 Compass initiated the war
2 for 1 return trips on any of its services
approximately $88 Sydney - Melbourne one way
fare
Initial trip to be between
25/06/91 and 15/07/91 and
second trip on same route
from 25/06/91 until
30/06/1992
23 June 1991 Australian discount 65% - more than 100 000 seats on a
number of routes including Adelaide one day sale
for travel from 1/07/91 - 18/09/91
tickets were to be paid for
within 72 hours of booking
and non-refundable.
Sydney - Melbourne $99
24 June 1991 Ansett match Australian Airlines discounts - extended
sale to 5/07/91 and tickets available for travel until
30 March 1992 - 50% discount on travel within
Western Australia
24 June 1991 Australian Spot $100 one-way fare Melbourne - Perth
24 June 1991 Eastwest $198 return Sydney - Melbourne, Brisbane or Gold
Coast
24 June 1991 Compass New discounts 55-70% - Sydney - Melbourne $88
available for purchase up to 15/07/91 and for
travel until 30/04/92.  Seats limited and to be paid
for within 72 hours of booking
24 June 1991 Ansett matched Compass fares
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25 June 1991 Ansett
Compass
Australian
further discounted fares on Sydney - Melbourne to
$85
27 June 1991 Eastwest discount Melbourne - Gold Coast to $140, Sydney
- Gold Coast to $80  Australian and Ansett
matched both fares
both available for travel until
April 1992
July 1991 •  Operations to Adelaide commence.
•  Discount war becomes more "savage".
•  Compass forms Compass Airlines Development Limited
(CADL) as a vehicle to buy shares into Australian Airlines in
case of its privatisation.
•  To cover for late delivery of 4th aircraft, leased plane from
Canadian Airlines.
1 July 1991 Ansett discount up to 69% on 156 routes for limited
number of seats booked before 13/07/91 and
flown by 31/03/92  direct competition between the
majors.
7 July 1991 Australian to undercut Compass entry on 15 July - cut $10
from return fares between Adelaide and other
capital cities and $50 between Adelaide and the
Gold Coast - offered 300,000 cheap fares until
31/07/91
7 July 1991 Ansett matched Australian discounts to Adelaide
7 July 1991 Compass cut fares by an additional $10
matched by Ansett and Australian
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19 July 1991 Compass discount "Freedom Fares" offered to business
travellers
Sydney - Melbourne - $95
tickets on sale until 14/08/92
usable anytime until
30/06/92
no advance specification of
day or time of travel
23 July 1991 Compass Special discounts to Perth
Sydney - Perth $170
Melbourne - Perth $145
24 July 1991 Australian responded to Compass' Perth fares
Melbourne - Perth - Melbourne $300 return
Sydney - Perth - Sydney $350 return
tickets on sale to 31/07 and
valid until 30/04/92
24 July 1991 Compass discounted Perth route fares by further $5
Melbourne - Perth $140
Sydney - Perth $160
also a discounted Melbourne - Perth return fare of
$250 for sale and use until August 1991
29 July 1991 Ansett extended discount campaign to 212 routes to
14/08/91 with validity remaining at 31/03/92
Perth - Melbourne one-way of $125
Compass and Australian also amended an
extension of the booking period to 14/08/91
August 1991 .  Sees the introduction of Frequent Flyer programmes.
.  Fares war gets more intense.
.  4th aircraft starts operations.
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5 August 1991 Australian new shallower discount schedule on sale until
31/10/91 and validity until 31/03/92
- aimed at Compass Freedom Fares
- availability of seats was limited compared with
Compass' fare
15 August 1991 Ansett matched Australian's new offer
16 August 1991 Compass extended the deeper discounting until 31/08/91
Melbourne - Adelaide reduced fare to $70    (-$5)
until end November
no refunds
payment within 72 hours of
booking
no restriction on
availability
16 August 1991 Compass Business Plan - introduced to replace the
Freedom Fares - available until 12/09/91 for travel
until 30/06/92
fares higher than the Freedom Fares
Sydney - Melbourne $125 c/- $95 - still cheaper
than Ansett and Australian's standard economy at
$229
payment within 72 hours of
booking
non-refundable but open
dated in a company name
and transferable to other
flights
22 August 1991 Ansett "Bizsaver Fare" similar fares and conditions to
Compass' Business Plan
25 August 1991 Ansett
Australian
Frequent Flyer Programmes
introduced FFPs with entrance fee.
No immediate response from Compass BUT
negative advertising pointing out that its new
lower fares offered better value than the FF
rewards
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September 1991 .  Fifth aircraft in place, Canadian plane retained.
.  Interim results for the year published in the press.  Compass
declares $10.3 mllion loss.  Company censured by ASX for lack
of disclosure.
.  Share price goes to $0.35 with $0.50 par value.
4 September 1991 Compass offered 2 free flights for 1 purchased and used
prior to 21/09/91
equivalent single fares of:
Sydney - Melbourne - $62
Sydney - Brisbane - $124
Sydney - Perth - $138
(Compass later admitted that this sale was a
gimmick)
tickets valid for 1 year
bookable only within 24
hours of flying
5 September 1991 Compass introduced sales of books of between five and fifty
tickets at discounts of between 25% and 40%
depending on the number of tickets - available
indefinitely
11 September 1991 Australian introduced "Money Saver" tickets equivalent to
Ansett Bix save and Compass' Business Plan,
both of which were due to expire on 12/09/91
available for purchase until 31/03/92 to counter
Compass' bulk purchase tickets and was cheaper
than Compass' although with more restrictions.
11 September 1991 Ansett 2 for one to be used prior to 31/10/91 and free
membership of Ansetts FF club for anyone who
joined the Golden Wings Club in September.
11 September 1991 Compass responded to "Money Saver" by reintroducing the
Compass Freedom Fares - cheaper than "Money
Saver" available for 1 week for use until 30/06/92
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17 September 1991 Bryan Grey in speech to BIE and BRW
Manufacturing Outlook Conference suggests that
airfares would rise in Oceober as demand picks
up for the period to January 1992.  (Power, 1991).
*Calling for a truce.
BUT - incumbents "Keeping Compass' head
below the water"
October 1991 .  Cashflow problems deepen.
.  Company unable to pay CAA and gets an extension.
.  Bryan Grey declares ("There was never any doubt that we
will survive').  Announces that company is now operating at a
profit.
3 October 1991 Ansett
Australian
further round of discounts - available for sale until
20.10.91 and for travel from 20/10/91 - 16/11/91
Sydney - Melbourne - $89
3 October 1991 Compass then dropped fares to $79 Sydney - Melbourne on
sale until 11/10/91 - valid up to end of summer.
3 October 1991 Ansett
Australian
matched the fares, validity extended to 30/06/92
3 October 1991 Eastwest joined in - cheap seats for sale until 20/10/91 and
valid up to 16/11/91
29 October 1991 Compass introduced 2 for 1 offer available for use until
5/12/91
31 October 1991 Ansett anniversary discount schedule available between
11/11/91 and 15/12/91 with Sydney - Melbourne at
$89 from $95
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31 October 1991 Compass introduced Freedom Fares for sale for 8 days but
open dated and usable for 12 months.  Sydney -
Melbourne at $127
31 October 1991 Australian followed Ansett's example
November 1991 .  Cash flow problems continue.
.  Major efforts to seek additional equity unsuccessful.
20 December 1991 Compass collapses, Bryan Grey blames the Federal
Government, the Civil Aviation Authority, Ansett and Australian
for its collapse.
21 December 1991 Ferrier Hogson and Company take over the Compass estate.
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Appendix B
FINANCIAL FORECASTS
COMPASS HOLDINGS LIMITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL FORECAST
ABRIDGED PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNTS
Years Ended 30th June
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000
Revenue          ----    154,250    378,264    383,409    428,092   438,251
Operating Profit before Tax ---- 20,281104,339107,025125,586134,081
Income Tax Expense          ----        1,445      41,736      42,810      50,234     53,633
Operating Profit after Tax ---- 18,836 62,603 64,215 75,352 80,448
Retained Profits Brought Forward          ----            ----        7,836        9,136        9,304     11,349
Profits Available for Appropriation ---- 18,836 70,439 73,351 84,656 91,797
Divident Payable          ----      11,000      61,303      64,047      73,307     79,979
Retained Profits Carried Forward          ----        7,836        9,136        9,304      11,349     11,818
BALANCE SHEETS
As at 30th June
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000
Issued Capital 55,000 55,000 70,000 70,000 70,000 70,000
Retained Profits          ----        7,836        9,136        9,304      11,349     11.818
Shareholders Funds    55,000      62,836      79,136      79,304      81,349     81.818
Unearned Revenue 700 18,883 29,425 29,425 33,921 33.735
Trade Creditors ---- 5,510 5,480 5,480 6.211 6.181
Provisions           66      13,247      72,370      71,178      84.743     89.664
Total Liabilities         766      37,640    107 275    106,083    124.875   129.580
Total Liabilities & Shareholder Funds    55,766    100,476    186,411    185,387    206.224   211.398
Fixed Assets 5,582 35,470 34,290 33,363 32.101 30.746
Security Deposits 3,981 9,873 10,405 19,372 16.706 18.039
Trade Debtors 335 30,487 30,930 30,955 35.749 35.641
Development Costs 10,535 20,466 15,833 11,199 6.565 1.931
Cash    35,333        4,180      94,953      90,498    115.103   125.041
Total Assets    55,766    100,476    186,411    185,387    206.224   211.398
PER SHARE DATA
Years Ended 30th June
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000
Earnings per share (cents)* ---- 17.1 44.7 45.9 53.8 57.5
Dividend payable pershare (cents)* ---- 10.0 43.8 45.7 52.4 57.1
Franking level (%) ---- ---- 52.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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*Adjusted for the exercise of 30,000,000 options by Keymaze Pty. Limited.
